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ABSTRACT  
In this dissertation, new approaches that utilize the one-way cryptographic hash functions 
in designing improved network security protocols are investigated. The proposed approaches are 
designed to be scalable and easy to implement in modern technology.  
The first contribution explores session cookies with emphasis on the threat of session 
hijacking attacks resulting from session cookie theft or sniffing. In the proposed scheme, these 
cookies are replaced by easily computed authentication credentials using Lamport’s well-known 
one-time passwords. The basic idea in this scheme revolves around utilizing sparse caching 
units, where authentication credentials pertaining to cookies are stored and fetched once needed, 
thereby, mitigating computational overhead generally associated with one-way hash 
constructions.  
The second and third proposed schemes rely on dividing the one-way hash construction 
into a hierarchical two-tier construction. Each tier component is responsible for some aspect of 
authentication generated by using two different hash functions. By utilizing different 
cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers, the hierarchical two-tier protocol (our second 
contribution) gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions for 
securing Internet cookies. Through indexing authentication credentials by their position within 
the hash chain in a multi-dimensional chain, the third contribution achieves improved 
performance. 
In the fourth proposed scheme, an attempt is made to apply the one-way hash 
construction to achieve user and broadcast authentication in wireless sensor networks. Due to 
 iv 
known energy and memory constraints, the one-way hash scheme is modified to mitigate 
computational overhead so it can be easily applied in this particular setting.  
The fifth scheme tries to reap the benefits of the sparse cache-supported scheme and the 
hierarchical scheme. The resulting hybrid approach achieves efficient performance at the lowest 
cost of caching possible.  
In the sixth proposal, an authentication scheme tailored for the multi-server single sign-
on (SSO) environment is presented. The scheme utilizes the one-way hash construction in a 
Merkle Hash Tree and a hash calendar to avoid impersonation and session hijacking attacks. The 
scheme also explores the optimal configuration of the one-way hash chain in this particular 
environment.    
All the proposed protocols are validated by extensive experimental analyses. These 
analyses are obtained by running simulations depicting the many scenarios envisioned. 
Additionally, these simulations are supported by relevant analytical models derived by 
mathematical formulas taking into consideration the environment under investigation. 
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 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1:
Our world today is signified by its unprecedented reliance on the Internet in all facets of 
life. From online banking and shopping, e-governance, medical recording, military surveillance 
to manufacturing and production, we are witnessing a cyber revolution that never once had been 
anticipated. Admittedly, this realization does not come without its caveats. One of the major 
hurdles that is potentially slowing down this trend and threatening its ascending wave is 
represented in the security threats associated with the inherent nature of the Internet. As the 
Internet advances, so do the cyber threats, and we see numerous occasions, that take place on a 
daily basis, where billions of dollars are lost due to the weakness of Internet security, or lack 
thereof. 
As an example of the counter-measures deployed to increase cybersecurity, one-way hash 
functions have been widely utilized in numerous applications to secure wired and wireless 
communication.  One-way hash functions, which are based on cryptographic hash functions, are 
a practical example of how forth we have come in our battle against cybersecurity threats and the 
advancement in the field of cryptography. Modern cryptography has enabled much of our 
Internet today and made electronic commerce thrive by helping companies and individual alike 
to maintain their privacy and the integrity of their data, when their information is shared from 
virtually everywhere distributed environment.  
Given the increasing amount of information spread over the Internet, the potential of 
information abuse by unlawful entities grows exponentially, thereby, emphasizing the need for 
powerful counter-measures to combat such abuse. Cryptography is by far the backbone of such 
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counter-measures, and its development will continue to evolve as long as threats prevail. 
Accordingly, cryptographic hash functions have evolved with this sole purpose in mind. 
This dissertation investigates the wide utilization of one-way hash functions and presents 
schemes that are hoped to increase their efficiency. The contributions introduced herein utilize 
one-way hash functions in a variety of ways, but they all share a quest for achieving better 
performance with the least amount of resources consumed.   
1.1 One-way Hashing 
One-way hashing is a common practice within cryptographic approaches used today. 
Hashing is a widely utilized technique in cryptography in which typical algorithms are deployed 
to encode information quickly. Typically, a “hash value” is achieved when these algorithms are 
applied to strings of text creating a “digital fingerprint” of the message. The digital fingerprint is 
expected to be identifiable by the respective entities who have access to the hash function used to 
create the hash value. One of the main benefits of hashing is that it enables us to know if the 
transmitted message/data has been altered from its original form or not. Once received, the 
hashed value is checked by the receiving entity using the agreed upon hash function primitives, 
and if the message conforms to the expected results it is accepted. Otherwise, the message might 
have been altered from its original form, and, thus, should be questionable.  
The use of hashing in cryptography is attractive for a variety of reasons. One important 
aspect of hashing revolves around the fact that the hashing algorithm generates a fixed length 
string to any piece of data to which the hashing algorithm is applied. Another feature that is 
worthy of noting here is that hashing is not analogous to encrypting. The two distinctive features 
that make hashing different from encryption have to do with one-wayness and the resulting 
message. Whereas encryption is a two-way process where data is transformed to a cipher-text 
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that is decoded at the destination site, hashing is a one-way operation that converts data into a 
compressed message digest that does not get decoded, but, rather the message digest is checked 
for integrity. Message integrity is the other distinctive feature making hashing different from 
encryption. One of the main goals of hashing is to check the integrity of the message between the 
communicating nodes. With hashing, we want to make sure the message is not altered from its 
original form during any stage of communication.  
Examples of applications that utilize hashing as a backbone solution for their designs are 
vast but just to name a few, here is a list of applications:  
1. Digital Signatures: were one of earliest applications of hash functions. Most digital 
algorithm schemes verify the authenticity of the message to be signed by utilizing hash 
functions. In 1978, Rabin in [1] introduced the idea using hash functions in the digital 
signature schemes. The idea is basically is to sign a hashed value of a piece of data M 
instead of signing this piece of data directly. The benefit from this technique is two-
fold. First, instead of directly signing a large set of data with a public key incurring 
extraneous computational overhead, hashing the data to produce a smaller sized 
message is much more efficient. The second reason is as we mentioned above is that 
hashing ensures the integrity of the message.  
2. Password hashing: Previously, storing passwords in plain text was a common procedure 
utilized by many service providers. Getting a hold of the passwords file stored in clear 
text can lead to compromising the privacy of all clients whose passwords are stored in 
the password file. Here, hashing techniques have been proven useful to overcome this 
problem. Instead of storing the password in plaintext in the service provider’s database, 
a hashed value of the password is stored. Each time the client tries to access a service 
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using their password, the password is hashed, and the hash digest is checked against the 
stored hash value. Unless they do not match, the client is granted access.  
3. Identity based encryption: hashing has also been beneficial for identity based 
encryption. Like digital signatures, users’ IDs can be large and incur high 
computational overhead to be encrypted, and also require to be handled privately. The 
use of hashing technique can help provide privacy as well as achieve efficient 
encryption.   
4. Hash trees: in this approach, the one-way hash functions are used in a binary tree to 
minimize the cost of authentication. The one-way hash functions are applied to data so 
that their sources can be verified via the use of the root hash and authentication path 
information.  
5. Hash calendar: a special type of hash tree in which one-way hash functions are applied 
to conceal time since a special point in the past. 
6. Message authentication code: this approach commonly known as MAC is used to 
protect a message’s authenticity and integrity. The hashing technique is central to this 
approach. A message authentication code is a keyed hash function, where input to the 
hash function is a message as well as a key. Both inputs are subjected to the hash 
function and the receiver can verify, given that he has the key, both the authenticity of 
the messages and its integrity. 
Given these great properties of hash functions, their application is endless and their 
versatility makes them a top choice for many developers for encryption and authentication 
purposes. Areas where hashing is utilized are vast, but just to name a few we take for instance 
 5 
(e.g. wireless sensor networks [2], [3], [4], [5], smart card based authentication schemes [6],  [7] 
and banking authentication schemes [8], [9]). This dissertation presents an investigation of a few 
applications of the one-way hashing techniques and proposes several solutions to try to optimize 
their configurations to achieve better performance. By introducing new and innovative solutions 
to overcome some of the inherent problems in typical hashing procedures, the main objective is 
to make hashing much more suitable for applications with limited recourses. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
Many web sites encrypt the user’s password and perform robust authentication using SSL 
based encryption during the initial login only, but do not apply the same level of costly HTTPS 
protection in further transactions. Web servers rely on session cookies saved locally at the client 
side to perform authentication after the initial login. Among the information stored in these 
cookies is a shared hashed secret, which is used as a proof that the user has been successfully 
authenticated at the initial login. As these cookies are transmitted over a wireless link using the 
unsecure HTTP protocol, the communication between the user and the web server is vulnerable 
to session cookie hijacking. An attacker could take over a user's account by sniffing out the 
transmitted HTTP cookies. By hijacking session cookies, it becomes possible for the attacker to 
impersonate the victim and interact with the web site without proper authorization. Admittedly, 
despite the advancement of security measures to combat such attacks, today’s Internet is much 
more prone to security breaches especially with the wide utilization of handheld and mobile 
devices. 
A similar threat is seen in the context of wireless sensor networks where tiny sensor 
networks cooperate to gain information of interest to the network administration. Two of the 
major shortcomings of today’s WSN are the scarcity of energy and memory resources. These 
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shortcomings make it difficult to devise security measures that suit them while at the same time 
provide robust and effective protection. To protect communication in WSNs, solutions based on 
public-key have been proposed. However, the aforementioned shortcomings make such solutions 
impractical. Alternatively, solutions based on the keyed-hash chains have been proposed.  
One way to secure the connection in both scenarios is utilize hashing techniques. In the 
first scenario, the session cookies can be, as suggested in [10], substituted by easily computed 
one-way credentials to achieve better handling of cookies and mitigating the possibility of them 
being sniffed out resulting in a potential hijacking of a user’s session. In the WSN context, the 
authentication of wireless sensor networks and users is a two way process. To secure this two 
way process between a user(s) and WSN sensor nodes, keyed-hash chains can be used to 
generate verifiable authentication tokens in both sides.  
The major difficulty with the one-way hash technique revolves around the fact that the 
efficient use of the chain requires an accurate estimation of the number of transactions expected 
during the lifetime of the session.  If the number of transactions is overestimated, the 
authentication in the early stages will suffer from an unjustified large computational overhead. If 
the number of transactions is underestimated, there will be the undesirable synchronization 
overhead of establishing a new secret and a new number for the remaining transactions. The 
shortcoming is detrimental for any context, but is more pronounced and risky if the devices 
handling communication are of limited resources.  
Like WSN’s, the context of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has benefitted from 
the one-way hash functions advantages. Namely, several researchers have proposed employing 
one-way hash functions in authentication schemes. However, due to scalability issues, using one-
way hash functions in their standard format can be challenging. Therefore, it can be helpful to 
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consider Merkle Hash Trees to reduce the computational overhead associated with straight 
forward implementation of one-way hash functions.   
A different yet important application of one-way hash functions for authentication is their 
application in multi-server environments. With the wide spread of the Internet, users usually 
have several sets of passwords and identities to access different services online. In fact, 
according to a recent survey about users’ password habits among American customers, 61% of 
people use a single password to access multiple websites and 54% of users have 5 passwords or 
less [11]. This reality increases the chances for passwords being forgotten and/or results in users 
choosing easy to remember uncomplicated passwords. For that reason, many applications are 
now providing opportunities for users to use a single identity to access a variety of services (i.e. 
Single Sign-On SSO). One-way hash functions are typically involved in the authentication of 
SSO. The challenge here is different. Many of the SSO environments suffer from weaknesses 
pertaining to the communication channel between communication nodes. More specifically, the 
fact that this channel is uni-directional, thereby lacking mutual authentication, necessitate 
looking for more novel technique to convert this channel into a bi-directional one to guarantee 
stronger authentication.  
1.3 Contributions 
In this dissertation, we investigate the possibility of optimizing the one-way hash 
constructions to achieve better handling of session cookies as well as user and broadcast 
authentication in WSNs. In addition, we investigate the utilization of hash calendars and Merkle 
hash trees to improve the authentication of Single Sign-On environments and radio frequency 
identification schemes in toll/traffic management. Therefore, seven solutions in which one-way 
hash functions are the core of authentication are presented. Although employed differently in 
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each of these solutions to fit each individual environment, one-way hash functions have proven 
useful.   
In the first contribution [12], we propose a solution geared towards session hijacking in 
the general context and mobile devices in particular. We evaluate the use of sparse caching 
techniques to reduce the overhead of one-way hash-chain authentication. Sparse cache schemes 
with uniform spacing, non-uniform spacing and geometric spacing are designed and analyzed. A 
Weighted Overhead formula is used to obtain insight into the suitable cache size for different 
classes of mobile devices. Additionally, the scheme is evaluated from an energy consumption 
perspective. We show that sparse caching can also be effective in the case of uncertainty in the 
number of transactions per user session. Our extensive performance tests have shown significant 
improvement achieved by the sparse caching schemes. 
In the second contribution [13], we try to lower the computational overhead of OHC by 
dividing the one-way hash chain to multiple smaller hash chains.  In doing so, we present a two-
tier one-way hash chain (TTOHC) protocol to secure cookie-based Internet transactions. By 
utilizing different cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers, our hierarchical TTOHC 
protocol gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions for 
securing Internet cookies. This solution also succeeds in lowering the computational overhead 
significantly, if compared to the straight forward implementation of the one-way hash chain 
protocol.  
Another area of interest to this dissertation is the collaborative computing environment 
and social networking. Collaborative computing is a relatively new computing paradigm whose 
success is contingent upon the success of the means used to facilitate it. Similar session hijacking 
threats do actually exist for collaborative networking, and, therefore, in the third contribution 
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[14] we design a protocol which mitigates the risks by adopting a position-indexed hashing 
scheme. Similar to the TTOHC protocol, this protocol utilizes multi-dimensional one-way 
hashing, but benefits from the idea of position-indexed hashing. The idea basically uses the 
position of the hashing operation within the chain as an additional argument in the hashing 
function input adding rigor and complexity to the hashed value. We also run evaluative 
experiments to verify the benefits of the proposed protocol, and the results indicate the 
superiority of the proposed technique over the straight-forwardly configured hashing protocol. 
An analytical model to compute the optimal lengths of the chains is presented. 
In the fourth contribution [15], we explore the possibility of applying the one-way hash 
function protocol to the user and broadcast authentication of wireless sensor networks. In order 
to do so, and to make the one-way hash protocol more attractive for this context, where energy 
and memory of wireless sensor networks are scarce as they are, we design a mini one-way hash 
chain protocol  that is computationally efficient, thereby preserving the memory and energy of 
WSN nodes.  
The fifth contribution [16] examines the potential benefits of a cache supported hybrid 
two-dimensional one-way hash construction to handle social networks’ user sessions 
authentication in collaborative applications. The proposed scheme is based on utilizing two-
dimensional OHC chains equipped with sparse caching capabilities to carry out authentication 
during users’ social networks sessions.  
The sixth contribution focuses on the context of mutli-server environments. In particular, 
a keyless signature scheme to handle single sign-on authentication is proposed. The proposed 
solution attempts to mitigate impersonation attacks commonly experienced in such environment. 
Merkle hash trees and hash calendars are employed to generate session keys without completely 
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relying on public/private keys to achieve authentication. In doing so, the proposed scheme 
provides bi-directional authentication.  
The final contribution [17] targets the radio frequency identification systems utilized in 
toll/traffic management environments. To address authentication in this setting, a scheme based 
Merkle hash trees is proposed. The main benefit of MHTs is its scalability compared to 
traditional schemes. Specifically, we try to improve traditional MHTs by a simple division 
mechanism where MHTs are split into smaller ones with the premise of improving efficiency. 
1.4 Dissertation Organization  
The dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter Two, we survey and discuss the 
relevant literature. In Chapter Three, we introduce our first contribution where we utilize the 
concept of sparse caching to enhance the security of cookie-based sessions in mobile devices. 
We demonstrate the main benefits of the proposed solution by presenting the results of our 
evaluation experiments. In Chapter Four, we present the second contribution, the two-tier one-
way hash chain protocol, along with the experiments conducted to measure its benefits. In 
Chapter Five, we investigate the idea of position-indexed hashing and its potential improvement 
of one-way hash chains constructions. The investigation is supported by an analytical model and 
evaluative experiments. In Chapter Six, we propose ideas to reduce the computational overhead 
of one-way hash chains to appropriate it in the context of wireless sensor networks. Chapter 
Seven presents the next contribution where a cache supported hybrid two-dimensional one-way 
hash construction scheme is employed to authenticate users’ session in collaborative and social 
networks environments. The scheme is evaluated mathematically to determine the cost of 
authentication and develop a quartic equation to check the optimal configuration of the two 
dimensions. We also evaluate the hybrid scheme with simulation experiments of different 
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configurations and scenarios.  In Chapter Eight, we discuss the context of multi-server networks 
where single sign-on solutions are employed to provide a more convenient Internet experience. A 
combination of hash calendars and Merkle hash trees is devised to produce a keyless signature to 
achieve an updated and bi-directional authentication in this setting. Like the previous chapters, 
Chapter eight presents the evaluation and simulations experiments results. Chapter Nine 
introduces the tree-based authentication scheme for a cloud based toll/traffic RFID systems and 
the relevant evaluation experiments. Finally, Chapter Ten concludes the dissertation and draws 
directions for future research in the area of one-way hash chain authentication.  
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 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  CHAPTER 2:
In this chapter, a review of the relevant literature is surveyed to try to bring into 
prominence the direction to which research in this area is heading, and situate the current 
research within the larger paradigm of cryptography and authentication. First, we present the 
literature pertaining to the session cookies illustrating how they evolved. We then introduce one-
hashing techniques and their application. The main objective of this chapter is to highlight the 
great potential of the one-way hashing schemes which made them applicable in many scenarios 
and contexts, and to review the work in the literature related to each of our proposed schemes.   
2.1  Introduction  
The past few years have witnessed an exponential growth in the use of smartphones and 
tablets to gain wireless access to the Internet.  This growth has been accompanied by a similar 
growth in cyber attacks over wireless links to steal session cookies and hijack private users’ 
accounts. In a 2010 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [18], broken 
authentication and session management attacks were identified among the top ten list along with 
injection, cross-site scripting and cross-site forgery attacks. In their 2013 Release, OWASP still 
lists these attacks, which lead to session hijacking, among the top 10 security threats of the 
Internet [19]. Additionally, the broken authentication and session management attacks have 
moved up in prevalence to be second in the list. Many tools have been shown to aid in such 
attacks for empirical purposes. For example, the Android application FaceNiff [20] makes it easy 
to hijack other people's sessions using an Android smartphone with root access. The application 
is claimed to work over any private Wi-Fi network using any of the common protocols, including 
WEP, WPA-PSK, WPA2-PSK, or no security at all. FaceNiff can be used to intercept web 
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session profiles and easily hijack sessions for Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Amazon, MySpace, 
Nasza-Klasa, blogger, etc. The only exception that disables FaceNiff is when the session is 
protected by EAP or SSL. In a similar vein, Firesheep [21], an extension for Firefox, clearly 
revealed that many sites fail to protect users against session hijacking attacks. To alert users of 
these vulnerabilities, a Firefox plug-in extension has been developed in [22] which notifies users 
if the server they are visiting is susceptible to cookie hijacking. This extension only gives 
warning for users to avoid risky web sessions but does not provide protection. 
Wireless networks have more types of security threats and are much more prone to 
malicious attacks than wired networks. Serious security vulnerabilities exist in all types of 
wireless networks including 802.11 wireless LANs, wireless ad hoc networks, multihop wireless 
mesh networks, and wireless sensor networks [23], [24], [25], [26]. Of particular interest to the 
current research is the security threat of hijacking user’ private sessions over wireless links. This 
threat is increasingly on the rise due to two reasons: i) the worldwide proliferation of 
smartphones, tablets and other handheld mobile devices as a primary tool for Internet access and 
ii) the increasing use of HTTP cookies by web applications to speed up responses to users and 
offer a better web experience that is more personalized and richer in interactivity. Since cookies 
are stored on the client’s machine, they are one of the most popular means available to web 
developers to create better web applications without requiring significant server resources.  
Session cookies are being increasingly used for many purposes including session and transaction 
authentication, tracking of shopping cart contents, identification of user's preferences, and 
tracking browsing behavior. Cookies usually exist as plain text on the client machine and can be 
tampered with by attackers if they succeed to compromise this machine.  
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The best way to overcome the issue of session hijacking is to use HTTPS (i.e., HTTP 
over SSL or TLS) throughout the lifetime of the session. This guarantees a fully secure session 
by encrypting users’ login information and securing all transactions between login and logout. 
However, due to the costly nature of this approach, many developers use HTTPS only in the 
login and initial authentication then revert to the approach of using cookies stored locally at the 
client’s side to carry out authentication throughout the remainder of the session. Session cookies 
store information about the identity of the client and a shared secret which indicates that the user 
has been authenticated in the initial login. Since these cookies are transmitted over unsecure 
links using the unsecure HTTP protocol, they are susceptible to malicious attacks which can sniff 
out session cookies and, consequently, take over a client’s identity and allow the attacker to gain 
the same level of access over the web application that the original user has.  
The use of cookies as a cheaper alternative to the wide utilization of the secure HTTPS 
protocol has been also attractive to many collaborative websites and social media networks. One 
cannot deny the fact that the unprotected nature of cookies can compromise the collaborative 
environment. Evidently, the availability of social networks and collaboration websites where 
access to the website is extended to long durations has made this issue even more pressing. 
Although using a secure protocol (e.g. HTTPS) to connect to the web provides higher levels of 
security, it is not always applied by many web servers and is replaced by cookie protection. The 
nature of cookies as plain text stored at the client’s side makes it not too complicated for an 
adversary to hack these cookies and steal the Internet session leading to a compromise in the 
users’ overall Internet experience.  
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2.2 Securing Session Cookies 
As mentioned above the most secure way to handle an internet session is to carry out this 
session using either The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol [27] and its successor, the 
Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS) [28], or the Secure-Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTPS) [29]. The encryption in the SSL/TLS protocol is achieved via utilizing asymmetric 
cryptography allowing applications between client-server to communicate without worrying 
about eavesdropping and tampering. The communication via the SSL/TLS protocol is carried out 
using an encrypted, secure channel that is established by using authentication certificates. Note 
that these authentication certificates can be mutually exchanged, thereby enabling mutual 
authentication between the server and clients for maximum protection. The HTTPS, on the other 
hand, is not considered a protocol by itself, but it achieves its security by working on top of 
SSL/TLS.  However, since the SSL/TLS is the backbone encryption mechanism used in HTTPS, 
the same can be said about the HTTPS.  
The security of the SSL/TLS protocols has resulted in their wide utilization in many 
applications as they are well-suited for finance, e-business, healthcare etc. However, these 
advantages do not come without their prices. One of the major drawbacks of the secure SSL/TLS 
and HTTPS protocols preventing their wide utilization in Internet is their demands for 
computational resources. Given the fact that they rely on authentication certificates to achieve 
their encryption and decryption, the computation required to transmit the certificate is an 
additional burden both on the client and the server sides. Furthermore, SSL incurs additional 
costs which many companies prefer to spare for other expenses. According to [30], web servers 
that employ SSL incur performance penalty that ranges from a factor 3.4 to 9 compared to web 
servers not utilizing SSL. For these reasons many websites prefer to use SSL/TLS based 
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communication for the initial login stages, and then resort to the less expensive, both 
computationally and economically, stateless internet protocol HTTP. In order to keep state and 
avoid the need for the user to identify himself to websites every time he logs in to a web site, we 
revert to cookies as carriers of users’ identity information. Imagine having to introduce yourself 
every time you meet someone. While this is not pertinent in real life, cookies are made with this 
imagination in mind. Unlike humans, this reality can pose serious threats to the Internet 
experience as these identifiers can be accessed and unlawfully exploited, thus, leading to attacks 
such as session hijacking.  
2.3 What Are Cookies? 
Cookies were originally invented to help facilitate the online e-commerce industry. The 
authors of [31] identify cookies as metadata that pertains to a pair of name/value information sent 
by an HTTP server to a user agent. Whenever the user agent tries to access URL that requires 
identification in the HTTP server, the cookies are used as identifiers. According to [32], cookies 
are the piece of information that the server and client pass back and forth. In addition, [32] 
indicates that the amount of information, whose content is at the discretion of the server, tends to 
be usually small. Although simply examining a cookie’s value will not reveal what the cookie is 
for, or what the value represents as [32] points out, information about the user can still leak out 
exposing privacy and potentially infringing the security of the internet experience. This is evident 
in the mechanism with which the HTTP cookies operate. As [32] further explains, “a cooperating 
client returns the cookie information verbatim in a Cookie header, one of its request headers, each 
time it makes a new request to the same server”. Thus, unless told by the server that the cookie is 
changed, the client will keep the previous cookie unchanged. Note that changing the cookie 
automatically supersedes the previous cookie [31]  
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Cookies can be of many types and flavors and can serve a variety of purposes. For 
example, there are session cookies, first party cookies, persistent cookies, secure cookies, and 
several more. Our main concern in this research is session cookies or more precisely, persistent 
cookies, and, thus, will be highlighted. As the name suggests, session cookies are mainly used to 
identify a user for a particular Internet session. One of the main features of sessions cookies is that 
they are subject to an expiration period or valid for a certain amount of time. First designed by 
[33] to keep state of the user in online shopping scenarios, session cookies are set up to have an 
end point set forth by the server. This end point, however, can be extended, as a convenient 
feature, to alleviate the need of users to enter their login credentials each time they log in, thereby 
resulting in a higher possibilities of them being sniffed out and exploited.  
2.4 Current Practices  
The security measures currently utilized to avoid the hijacking of session cookies are 
lacking both in depth and dearth. In fact, the authors of [34] point out that the use of cookies in 
web sessions has not evolved much since its first days indicating that they are susceptible to 
attacks such as eavesdropping. The fact that web sessions utilizes static tokens sent over a 
plaintext channel makes it possible for an eavesdropper to possibly take over the session [34]. 
This threat is on the rise due to the wide utilization of wireless networks. On the threat caused by 
wireless connection, the authors of [34] highlight that users freely connect to the wireless base 
stations and then are asked for login credentials of the web sites they are trying to access, 
allowing wireless operators to manage per-user password access-control. They further explain 
that wireless operators should not be doing this practice and limiting password exposure to that 
pertaining to the Wi-Fi service they are providing.  
 18 
Several solutions have been proposed to address the problem of session cookie hijacking 
in wired and wireless networks. Liu et al. [35] proposed a secure cookie protocol for ensuring 
integrity of each transmitted cookie by applying HMAC on the concatenation (username | 
expiration time | data | session key). Their fundamental assumption, however, is that their secure 
cookie protocol would either encrypt the data using a session key or run on top of SSL. As 
mentioned above, the use of HTTPS throughout the internet session is not only computationally 
inadequate due to the large computation associated with key generation and handling, it is also 
very costly. Many websites have different servers that they rely on, and to provide HTTPS on 
their servers would incur extraneous costs that might be unnecessary.  
Given that SSL is not always optimal for all applications, Adida [34] proposed a 
technique called SessionLock as an  alternative to the wide utilization of SSL. Essentially, 
SessionLock works in two stages: the first sage is done using a secure connection on top of SSL 
and involves establishing a session key, and the second stage is where the remainder of the 
session is carried out and it is run on HTTP. Using HMAC as a cryptographic function, a shared 
session secret is generated and used to encrypt each subsequent request from the client to the 
server. While this solution offers potential in solving session hijacking especially, it is not robust 
against different types of attacks especially active attackers who can amend or even steal the 
session key and use it unlawfully. In HMAC based techniques, the compromise of the shared key 
compromises the whole session as all future values of HMAC can be easily calculated. 
Moreover, techniques such as URL re-writing and URL fragmentation, which are essential in the 
SessionLock solution, might not be suitable for different applications.  
Another direction of research suggests the use of an external proxy where authentication 
and sensitive information management are carried out completely at the proxy or some other 
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external device (e.g. a user’s cell phone) [36],[37]. However, this solution’s implementation can 
pose difficulties as it might not be optimal in all situations. Specifically, if a user does not have 
access to the proxy for any reason or in case the external device is not available at the time the 
service is desired (e.g., cellphone battery is dead, no coverage...etc.), he will not be able to use 
the service provided by the web application.     
2.5 New Direction 
We have seen in the previous section that for the most part current practices to secure 
session cookies are either based on the wide utilization of SSL/TLS based connection, or on 
solutions that are not as rigorous. Alternatively, a possible candidate to address the problem of 
session hijacking caused by the lacking security of Internet cookies is the Lamport’s well-known 
one-way hash chain technique for one-time passwords [38] which was later formulated by Haller 
to the S/Key standard [39]. Lamport’s ideas were very attractive to many researchers. For 
example, the attack-resilient security architecture ARSA [40], proposed for multihop wireless 
mesh networks, uses a hierarchical one-way hash chain to authenticate beacons transmitted by 
mesh routers. The Ariadne secure on-demand Adhoc network routing protocol [41] uses hash 
chains in its Route Discovery phase and in later phases to thwart the effects of routing 
misbehavior. The SEAD protocol [42] proposed for Adhoc networks also uses a one-way hash 
chain for authenticating important routing information such as the routing metric and the 
sequence number. This prevents any malicious nodes from falsely advertising a better route or 
tampering with the critical routing information contained in the packet that it received from the 
source.  
Several proposals have tried to address the problem of session cookies’ exploitation by 
adopting schemes which rely on Lamport’s one-way passwords. For instance, [43] proposed a 
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solution that targets the read-only property of the session cookies in the website’s databases. 
They achieve their protection by leveraging the read property so that it becomes hard for an 
attacker to correctly guess the cookie value. Conceptually, they suggest including an iterated 
hashed value of the user’s password and its pre-image in the session cookies. These two values 
are compared each time a communication between the server and client is desired. To strengthen 
the cookies, they add a salt value which they claim makes it even harder for an adversary to 
detect the users’ private information. 
We, therefore, address the potential benefits of applying the one-way hash chain as a 
technique to secure session cookies. Our objective is to propose schemes which not only 
preserve the cryptographic strength of one-way hash chains, but also use it in a computationally 
efficient manner. Unlike HMAC based schemes discussed above, using the one-way hash chains 
to secure cookies minimizes the chances of them being sniffed out and abused for unlawful 
utilization by entities other than the respective parties.  
The one-way hash chain technique has been recently used to protect against cookie 
hijacking in wireless networks. The One-Time-Cookies (OTC) protocol proposed in [10] is a 
straightforward implementation of Lamport’s hash chain technique for one-time passwords. The 
authors implemented OTC as a plug-in for Firefox and Firefox for mobile browsers. OTC uses a 
hash chain construction to generate a sequence of values that can be used as one-time 
authentication tokens. These tokens, once verified by the web application, cannot be reused due 
to the pre-image resistance property of cryptographic hash functions. The Rolling Code protocol 
proposed in [44] is an attempt to reduce the computational overhead of the OTC protocol for 
mobile devices with constrained memory. The protocol replaces the hash chain performed by 
OTC in each transaction by two hash operations: one to update and randomize the value of a 
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variable d = hash(d) and the other to produce a one-time authentication token by applying a hash 
function on the Exclusive-OR of a secret seed and the new value of d. In essence the protocol is 
much like the rolling code technology used to prevent perpetrators from recording a code and 
replaying it to open a garage door. The Rolling code protocol is less robust than the one-way 
hash chain approach (e.g., the OTC protocol) but is lightweight and more suitable for mobile 
phones and PDA’s. Although the seed is guaranteed to be fresh during each iteration due to the 
monotonic function used to increase the value of d, there is a high risk of discovering this value 
and consequently compromising the internet session.  
2.6 The One-way Hash Chain Model 
We first present the notations for the one-way hash chain technique that we will use in 
this dissertation. We will refer to this hash chain technique as the HACH technique, which can 
be described as follows:  
HACH uses an initial secret s which is the seed of the hash chain. We apply a 
cryptographic hash function H() successively to obtain the following values  
V0 = s 
V1  = H(V0) = H
1
(s) 
V2  = H(V1) = H
2
(s) 
… 
Vj  = H(Vj-1) = H
j
(s) 
… 
VN     = H(VN-1) = H
N
(s) 
 
Due to the pre-image resistance property of the hash function (e.g., SHA-1), the values Vi 
are distinct and can therefore be used to represent one-time authentication tokens in successive 
user transactions after the initial login, i.e., the value of the appropriate V token is stored in the 
session cookie transmitted by the client to the server in each transaction. To properly use the 
one-way hash chain, these values must be transmitted in reverse order. In the first transaction 
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after login, the client browser transmits the value VN. Similarly, the client transmits VN-1 in the 
second transaction and VN-i+1 in the i
th
 transaction.   
During the initial HTTPS authentication, a shared secret value s and a value chain length 
N representing the number of transactions are exchanged between the client and the server. After 
the initial login, the costly HTTPS protocol is replaced by HTTP and authentication is done by 
sending the one-time authentication tokens in the session cookies. Upon receiving the value of an 
authentication token, the server computes a similar value based on the values of N and s, and 
accepts the transaction if the received value matches the computed value.  
The variable N is the chain length and represents an upper bound on the number of 
transactions that can be handled by the above hash chain. One difficulty with the HACH 
technique is that the efficient use of the chain requires an accurate estimation of the value of N, 
i.e., the number of transactions expected during the lifetime of the session.  If the number of 
transactions is overestimated, the authentication in the early steps will suffer from an unjustified 
large computational overhead. If the number of transactions is underestimated, there will be the 
undesirable synchronization overhead of establishing a new secret and a new number for the 
remaining transactions. For our initial presentation of the sparse caching technique, we will 
assume that the number of transactions in a session, N, is accurately known. Later in the 
dissertation, we will show how the sparse caching technique can be used to effectively deal with 
the case when the value of N is not accurately known.  
We will use the number of hash operations executed per transaction as the metric to 
evaluate the execution overhead of the process of verifying this transaction using the 
authentication token transmitted by the client. We denote this metric for the i
th
 transaction by 
HCosti. Smaller values of this metric indicate faster speeds for the authentication process. The 
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total cost of the entire session is the sum of the costs of the N transactions and is denoted by 
TotalHCost.  
In its most basic format, the 1
st
 transaction in the HACH protocol computes H
N
(s) and has 
a cost HCost1 = N. In general, the i
th
 transaction computes H
N-i+1
(s) and has a cost HCosti = N-
i+1.  We have  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ (𝑁 − 𝑖 + 1) =
𝑁(𝑁+1)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1  ( ‎2.1 ) 
 
The maximum and average value of the transaction execution overhead are given by 
HCostmax = N 
HCostavg  = (N+1)/2 
 
It is important to stress that the authentication tokens are generated by successive hashing 
from V0 to XN but are exposed (i.e., presented as authentication tokens) from VN to V0.  The 
reverse presentation of the values of the hash sequence is a fundamental feature that must be 
enforced in order to attain the good security properties of one-way hash chains. Exposing 
(presenting) the hash sequence values in the same forward order in which they are generated 
makes the scheme much less secure because if one hash value is compromised, the attacker can 
compute all the hash values that will be used in the future. 
The HACH protocol in the above description is the backbone of our solutions. In the four 
proposed schemes, we try to optimize the HACH by reducing its computational overhead to suit 
different scenarios and contexts. The different techniques utilized try to benefit as much as 
possible from the advantages of the HACH protocol maintaining its cryptographic strength, 
while at the same time minimizing the drawback inherently associated with its construction.   
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2.7 User and Broadcast Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks 
Another area of interest that we investigated in this dissertation is user and broadcast 
authentication in wireless sensor networks. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a collection of 
tiny sensor nodes that work collaboratively to gather information. Typical shortcomings of 
wireless sensor nodes include their limited storage and power resources. Versatile as they are, 
WSNs have gained acceptance and are being widely used in various arenas such as military 
sensing and tracking, traffic monitoring, industrial quality control, medical monitoring, etc. With 
the fast rate of acceptance of such networks, they are expected to grow both in capacities and 
capabilities.  
One of the important issues slowing down this growth in deployment lies in their security 
vulnerability. Attacks on WSNs can be as easy as intercepting messages, falsifying data and 
impersonating users to gain access. Such attacks can only be avoided by exercising robust and 
effective security measures that prevent unlawful access of unauthorized entities. The fact that 
sensor nodes in WSNs are not well-endowed in terms of memory and energy makes it necessary 
for solutions addressing such attacks to be lightweight, efficient and memory/energy preserving.  
Solutions proposed to address the problem of security issues in WSNs are still work in 
progress. Specifically, authenticating the data broadcast and users over a WSN is very crucial. 
Researchers such as [45], [46], [47] suggest using public-key based solution. However, with 
limited energy and memory capabilities, such solutions can pose difficulties in deployment due 
to high cost of calculating public keys. Alternatively, solutions based on the keyed-hash chains 
have been proposed [48], [49]. However, if used in the basic configuration where a shared key is 
hashed with no limits on the length of keyed-hash chain, two major problems arise. Similar to 
session cookies security issues discussed above, the shared key in the WSN can be compromised, 
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and, hence, data might be at risk putting the whole WSN in danger. Second, the length of the 
keyed-hashed chain can grow considerably leading to an unjustified overhead that cannot be 
handled by a sensor node with limited memory and energy.  In this dissertation, we investigate 
these two problems and try to address them by adapting the HACH protocol to achieve broadcast 
and user authentication for WSNs.  
2.8 Authentication in Single Sign-On Environments 
Due to the proliferation of social networking, cloud computing and the Internet of things, 
Single Sign-On schemes are now becoming more popular. Social networking giants such 
Facebook, Google Twitter and several others are providing SSO services to the public. Protocols 
utilizing Browser-based Single Sign-On (SSO) provide convenience and security for users and 
service providers alike. By employing SSO protocols, users are relieved the burden of having to 
possess multiple sets of IDs and passwords for different web services they wish to use. Similarly, 
service providers are relieved the burden of a variety of login-related tasks such as clients 
contacting them for stolen passwords, recovering of forgotten passwords, revocation of possibly 
compromised passwords etc. As such, by substituting multiple identities corresponding to 
multiple service providers connected via a central identity provider with a single identity, SSO 
protocols are promising a more secure Internet experience, especially given that clients typically 
use easy to remember weak passwords and usually use the same passwords to access different 
applications. 
An SSO authentication scheme rely on three main components: the users wishing to be 
granted access to certain services, the service provider SP (also known as the relying party) and 
the Identity Provider (IdP) who delegates identity assertions to the SP. Several researchers have 
discovered critical security concerns related to the communication between these three 
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components (e.g. [50], [51] ). In an extensive analysis of SSO, the authors of [50] detected 
several serious logic flaws in commonly deployed SSO systems and RP’s. Similarly, the authors 
of [51] have identified flaws in two of the commonly utilized SSO frameworks, namely, SAML 
SSO and OpenID that lead to hijacking a user’s authentication attempt and accessing resources 
without the user’s consent. Such impersonation attacks can be detrimental to the utilization of 
SSO schemes, as they can lead to exposing of critical information about the users thereby 
threatening their privacy. 
SSO authentication schemes generally aim to provide the users with the convenience of 
singing in to one portal and gaining access to several services. Therefore, they inherent many of 
the password related features present in common authentication systems such as the Lamport 
authentication protocol [38]. After successful login, session authentication is typically achieved 
via either a secure channel such an SSL or in a cookie supported HTTP connection. While they 
have been relatively successful in securing communication in conventional computing 
environments, they fell short in the context of SSO due to their inability to provide robustness 
and rigor in authentication required for this setting.  
Therefore, researchers have tried to come with solutions particularly designed to suit the 
SSO environment. The majority of schemes designed to suit SSO fall within two main 
categories: hash-based authentication schemes and public-key based authentication schemes. 
Among the early attempts to design a hash-based authentication architecture for SSO is reported 
in [52] who proposed an authentication protocol that guarantees users’ anonymity by employing 
a combination of public key and session token infrastructure. However, this scheme was shown 
to have vulnerabilities due to the public nature of the session token, thereby leading to 
impersonation and identity disclosure attacks as shown in [53]. The authors of [53], alternatively, 
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proposed utilizing timestamping to improve the strength of the session key-based approach. 
Yang et al. in [54] identified a weakness in the previous protocol resulting in the possibility of 
the service providers getting a hold of the clients session ID, and they proposed an improvement 
which relies on public-key cryptographic infrastructure. However, as they point out, their scheme 
is prone to DoS attacks. These three schemes all rely on the use of smart cards as an additional 
authentication factor. Although there followed several improvements on the smart card solutions 
(e.g. [55], [56], [57] [58]), relying on a central agency to issue smart card credentials for the 
whole network can be problematic as it increases single point of failure which can be detrimental 
to the whole scheme.  
Another group of SSO authentication protocols that have gained popularity and became 
widely adopted in today’s SSO environments is the Security Assertion Markup Language SAML 
[59], [60], and the OpenID Project [61]. One of the essential reasons why the two SSO 
authentication mechanisms have gain popularity can be attributed to the fact that both are 
browser-based solutions. In other words, unlike the schemes discussed earlier which require 
additional resources such as a smart card issuing entity, the SAML and the OpenID simply 
require a standard web browser as a user agent. The SAML authentication protocol relies on sets 
of public and private keys for verification, whereas the OpenID depends on session cookies as a 
verification mechanisms. However, both schemers were found to have critical vulnerabilities 
pertaining to the logic with which they are designed. In particular, the fact that both are uni-
directional and the possibility of using multiple SSL connections render them susceptible to 
attacks such as impersonation and hijacking attacks. In this dissertation, we propose an 
authentication protocol that is bi-directional and guarantees the recentness of authentication 
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assertions. Specifically, we utilize the idea of keyless signatures proposed in [62] in conjunction 
of Merkle Hash Trees [63] to authenticate communication in the SSO network.  
2.9 Authenticating Cloud-based Toll/Traffic RFID Systems 
Due to its capacity to wirelessly and remotely identify tagged objects, RFID (Radio 
Frequency Identification) technology has long been used in numerous applications to track 
assets, enable supply chain management, track commodities in retail stores, payment, security 
and access control and many more. Recently, vehicular and traffic management applications 
have adopted this technology in road tolls administration and enforcement. Many municipalities 
around the world depend on RFID for electronic toll tracking/ payment through devising RFID 
tags mounted in the cars or plates of their customers. TransCore, one of the biggest RFID 
providers, indicate that over 3.5 million customers travel their electronic tolling systems at 
highway speeds and simply pay their tolls using RFID tags or their vehicle license plates [64]. 
The Express Way Authority in Central Florida, for example, says that in 2013, the number of 
transponders used to track their electronic toll operations is estimated at around 530.000 units; a 
number that has grown steadily throughout the past 10 years [65]. According to a report by E-
ZPass Group, the number of transponders in their road toll system has more than doubled in less 
than ten years from around 13 million in 2005 to more than 26 million transponders 2013 [66]. 
The RFID technology is moving toward being adopted in more traffic related applications such 
as tag registration and number plate tracking. Such applications are promising since they can 
solve a lot of traffic issues experienced today such as congestion, car theft, and rental fleet 
management; all of which can bring about better utilization of current infrastructures.     
As part of its thriving evolution to become a more enabling technology, the RFID 
schemes are presenting architectures which benefit from cloud computing to provide more 
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resilient and catering solutions for companies. The context of traffic and road toll management is 
one of the beneficiary applications of this trend, as managing data that grows exponentially 
throughout the years can be very costly and can hinder the future of RFID in traffic management 
and application. Therefore, moving to a cloud-assisted traffic management scheme definitely 
reduces some of the costs associated with storing and handling vehicles’ information. However, 
this movement is not without cost. Authenticating cloud-based RFID schemes is challenging 
because such schemes inherent security flaws of both the RFID technology and cloud computing. 
The majority of RFID schemes presented in the literature targeting road tolls and traffic 
contexts have been concerned with the engineering and conceptual aspects of the issue (e.g. [67], 
[68]). However, little research has been conducted to investigate the issue of authentication in 
RFID based toll/traffic management systems. This dissertation also tries to address this issue in 
addition to the previous ones. In this section, we overview some of the related literature to the 
RFID in general.  
The authors of [69] stress the importance of authentication in RFID systems. They 
indicate that RFID systems are susceptible to security threats due to the fact that they work non-
line-of-sight in a contactless fashion, thereby, allowing attackers to remotely and passively 
launch attacks without being noticed. The resulting security concerns can be unwanted consumer 
tracking, tag forgery and unauthorized access of tags’ memory content. As a result, any RFID 
scheme should address this issue. Strong authentication of RFID systems, according to [69], are 
efficient in combating such attacks. Many authentication schemes proposed thereafter attempt to 
achieve this property. Authentication can be achieved through cryptographic based approaches 
such as symmetric block ciphers and one-way hash based schemes. Examples of schemes that 
adopt symmetric block ciphers include [70], [71], [72]]. The main drawback of symmetric block 
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cipher solutions is the high computational overload associated with the calculation scheme. 
Alternatively, solutions based on the one-way hash chain constructions such as [73], [74], [75] 
have been proposed. However, with a network of RFID readers and RFID tags as big as the 
traffic/ road toll management that can go up to several hundreds of thousands of tags and readers, 
these solutions will suffer from a scalability problem. Both symmetric block cipher schemes and 
one-way hash chains solutions suffer from this problem, as a linear search is needed in the 
database each time the reader tries to identify a tag. This problem is more prominent in the above 
described scenario where many readers and tags alike can require access to the database at the 
same time; which renders such protocols unsuitable for traffic/ road toll applications.  
Schemes based on binary trees have shown benefit in improving the scalability by 
reducing the search complexity from O(N) in the linear search schemes to O(logN), where N 
represents the number of RFID tags in the network.  
The traffic/ road toll scenario presents challenging dimensions in the employment of 
RFID schemes. First, the majority of RFID readers in the system are stationary making physical 
capture of them far-fetched. However, readers in this context are typically given one chance to 
read the RFID tags since RFID-equipped vehicles typically pass through the RFID readers range 
only once. Thus, the reading window is limited and readers cannot afford a complex search, such 
as the one achieved by a linear search. As stated above, a tree-based solution achieves acceptable 
and relatively low complexity searches.  
In this dissertation, we introduce a tree-based solution that reinforces the RFID 
authentication process by predefining the tree upper bound, thereby, spreading the data of the 
RFID system into multiple trees. Our aim from doing so is to reduce the computational overhead 
while at the same time improving scalability. 
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 HASH CHAIN (HACH) WITH SPARSE CACHING CHAPTER 3:
TECHNIQUES 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we present and evaluate the use of sparse caching techniques to reduce the 
overhead of one-way hash-chain authentication. Sparse cache schemes with uniform spacing, 
non-uniform spacing and geometric spacing are designed and analyzed. A Weighted Overhead 
formula is used to obtain insight into the suitable cache size for different classes of mobile 
devices. Additionally, the scheme is evaluated from an energy consumption perspective. We 
show that sparse caching can also be effective in the case of uncertainty in the number of 
transactions per user session. 
3.2 Sparse Caching: Basic Idea 
The main drawback of the HACH protocol, as elaborated in Chapter Two, is the need to 
perform the hashing operation N times for the first transaction, N-1 times for the second 
transaction, and so on. For large values of N, the Hash Chain (HACH) technique is costly and is 
not generally suitable for most mobile devices that have scarce memory resources. In this 
chapter, we propose using a sparse caching approach to attain the full level of security of one-
way hash chains but at a much reduced computational overhead. An earlier proposal for sparse 
caching was given by Gupta et al. [76] as a way to reduce directory memory requirements. The 
hallmark of this approach is that a memory block is allocated for each active entry and 
invalidated data is discarded as they are no longer needed. Because of this feature, sparse 
caching techniques have been appealing in a variety of environments and applications. The 
authors of [77], for instance, proposed a method to improve users’ perceived performance in 
wireless networks using sparse infrastructure. Also, the authors of [78], [79] suggested using 
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sparse caching in multimedia applications. As we describe our proposed solution, we also 
introduce several cache spacing configurations that are deployable in different scenarios.  
cache[0] = s            
cache[1] = H
20
(s),  
cache[2] = H
40
(s),  
cache[3] = H
60
(s),  
cache[4] = H
80
(s). 
 
The above values can be computed using a simple loop that computes the hash function 
80 times. The availability of the above cache values reduces the execution overhead of 
transactions considerably. For example, the first transaction can  now start by fetching the value 
of cache[4] then performing 20 more hashes to obtain H
20
(H
80
(s)) = H
100
(s). The value HCost1 
for the first transaction has been reduced from 100 to 20. Basically the sparse caching scheme 
has divided the initial hash chain into five mini-chains, each with length 20.  
The above example uses sparse caching with uniform (equal) spacing. We will examine 
non-uniform spacing later, but we will first formally define the uniform spacing model and 
examine its characteristics.  
3.2.1 Sparse Caching with Uniform Spacing 
This scheme is defined by two parameters, the size of the cache, cache_size, and the 
uniform space interval, minichain_len. In the above example, cache_size = 5 and  
minichain_len= 20.  
The pseudo code to compute the authentication token of the i
th
 transaction is presented 
below. Notice that in the i
th
 transaction, the client transmits the value VN-i+1 = H
N-i+1
(s). 
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Authentiaction_Token(i); 
   k = (N-i) / minichain_len      // integer division 
   m = N - (k  minichain_len) 
   VN-i+1 = H
m
(cache[k]) 
 
Using the uniform sparse caching scheme, the total cost of a session including the cost of 
the initial cache setup is given by   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶 ×
𝑀(𝑀+1)
2
=  
𝑁(𝑀+1)
2
      ( ‎3.1 ) 
Where C = cache_size, M = minichain_len, and N=CM.  
The above formula is derived under the simplifying assumption that N is divisible by C. 
The cost TotalHCost is the sum of two components:  a cost of (C-1)M for the initial filling of 
the cache values and a cost of (C-1)M(M+1)/2 for the N transactions. Notice that (C-1) of the 
N transactions will not need to perform any hashing since the required value is already in the 
cache. For the above example of N = 100 and C = 5, transaction # 21 will simply read V80 from 
cache[4]. The maximum and average value of the transaction execution overhead are given by 
HCostmax = M       // for the 1
st
 transaction 
HCostavg = 
0.5×(𝐶−1)×(𝑀−1)
𝐶
        ( ‎3.2 ) 
In section 3.4, we evaluate the tradeoffs of the sparse caching scheme and examine 
policies for selecting the cache size C for different values of N. It is important to notice that the 
sparse caching scheme is applied only to the user mobile device, not to the server.  The server 
can compute the same authentication tokens using any caching scheme; for example it may use a 
complete caching scheme that stores all authentication tokens in the cache during initialization. 
 34 
3.2.2 Weighted Overhead Formula 
For a session with N transactions and a user with a certain mobile device, what would be 
the best cache_size C? In answering this question, we first recognize that wireless users can use 
mobile devices having a wide range of capabilities. Some users may use high-end laptops that 
have plenty of storage resources while others may use mobile phones with limited memory. We 
use the following Weighted Overhead (WO) formula to obtain insight into the suitable value of 
the cache_size C.  
WO = 𝑊 × 𝐶𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡      ( ‎3.3 ) 
Where w is the weight assigned to the cost of using memory in the mobile device. The 
Weighted Overhead formula is simply a pragmatic approach to select the size of the cache for the 
different categories of mobile devices. The Weighted Overhead WO obtained from the formula 
can be viewed as the combined cost of memory and execution overhead where w is the cost of 
memory relative to a unit cost of execution. The value of w may be assigned based on classes. 
For example, we may have three classes of mobile devices with the following weights. 
Class 1: w1 is used for high-end laptops with plenty of memory. 
Class 2: w2 is used for mobile devices, e.g., high end smartphones and tablets, with 
reasonable but constrained memory resources. 
Class 3: w3 is used for mobile devices, e.g. low-end mobile phones, with very limited 
memory resources. 
We have the obvious relationship w3 > w2 > w1. To choose the best cache size for a 
mobile device, we simply minimize the value of the Weighted Overhead.  For Class 1, the value 
of w1 is nearly zero and the minimization problem reduces to minimizing the second term 
 35 
TotalHCost. Minimizing TotalHCost is achieved by choosing the largest possible value of cache-
size, which is simply N. This means that for high-end laptops, the sparse caching scheme is 
replaced by complete caching in which the authentication token value Vj is obtained by fetching 
cache[j] without performing any hash computation. For Class 2 and 3, plotting the value of 
Weighted Overhead versus cache_size could reveal the best size that minimizes the combined 
cost.  
In section 3.4.4, we present performance results that show how the Weighted Overhead 
formula can be used to gain insight into selecting the size of cache.   
3.2.3 Uncertainty in the Number of Transactions  
In all previous discussions, we assumed that the number of transactions in a session, N, is 
accurately known. In real-life applications, however, the value of N is usually only 
approximately known. If the application developer chooses a value for N that is too small, the 
hash chain will be exhausted before finishing all of the transactions of the session. If the selected 
value of N is too large, the transactions will have large execution overhead. It is difficult for an 
application developer to consistently strike a good balance of N for the different sessions of the 
different users. The sparse caching approach presented earlier comes into play to elegantly solve 
this problem. Below, we elaborate on this issue.  
Suppose that we know that a session will have approximately 1000 transactions but there 
is some likelihood that it could have up to 2000 transactions. Without any caching, the developer 
will be tempted to choose a value of N between 1000 and 2000 to strike a balance between 
reducing HCost for the individual transactions and avoiding the scenario of exhausting the chain 
and resorting to costly HTTPS authentication and additional hash chain setup. By placing a 
single cached value cache[1] = H
1000
(s) at the middle of the range, the developer can safely 
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select N = 2000 with a guarantee that HCostmax will be 1000 and the costly HTTPS re-
initialization will not be needed. By placing a second cached value at 2000, the developer can 
extend the value of N to 3000 with the same guarantee that HCostmax will be 1000 and the costly 
HTTPS initialization will not be needed. The sparse caching scheme can be used with few 
cached units to extend the range of N to a large safe value without incurring an increase in the 
execution overhead of individual transactions or running the risk of additional HTTPS setup. 
In section 3.4, we present test results that illustrate the application of sparse caching for 
the case of approximate values of N.  
3.2.4 Sparse Caching with Non-uniform Spacing 
The case of uncertain values of N motivates the use of sparse caching with non-uniform 
distribution. We elaborate on this by an example.  
Suppose it is highly probable that the number of transactions in a user session will be 100 
or less but there is some small probability that this number could go up to 500. As shown earlier, 
we could use the sparse caching scheme to set the value of N to 500 without increasing the value 
of HCostmax above 100. We can actually do better than this by choosing non-uniform cache 
spacing to significantly improve the execution overhead of the first likely 100 transactions. For 
example, we can distribute 9 cache values  non-uniformly as follows:        
cache[0] = s 
cache[1] = H
100
(s)  
cache[2] = H
200
(s) 
cache[3] = H
300
(s) 
cache[4] = H
400
(s) 
cache[5] = H
420
(s) 
cache[6] = H
440
(s) 
cache[7] = H
460
(s) 
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cache[8] = H
480
(s) 
The above scheme gives priority to the first 100 transactions with a guaranteed value of 
HCostmax = 20. The other less likely 400 transactions will be guaranteed a value of 
HCostmax=100. 
Schemes for the forward generation and reverse presentation of one-way hash chains can 
use different topologies including tree topologies. But the simplicity of the proposed sparse 
caching authentication scheme and its flexibility in dealing with different scenarios (such as the 
non-uniform spacing discussed in this section or the geometric spacing discussed in the next 
section) make the scheme more practically appealing than other schemes for implementing one-
way hash chains [80]. 
In section 3.5, we present the results of our tests to evaluate non-uniform spacing for 
sparse caching.  
3.2.5 Caching with Geometric Spacing 
In the previous section, the non-uniform spacing of cached values was achieved by 
creating two groups: the high priority group (first 100 transactions in the above example) and the 
low priority group (the remaining less likely 400 transactions). Within each group, the cached 
values are distributed uniformly. This scheme is suitable when the value of N is not accurately 
known but there is knowledge about the minimum value of N, i.e., the number of transactions 
that are most likely or are guaranteed to occur. If this knowledge is not available (i.e., the value 
of N could range from a small number to a large number), it would be better to distribute the 
cached values at progressively increasing intervals. One possible progressive strategy is the 
geometric distribution scheme. We illustrate this scheme using the previous example in which 
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the value of N could be as small as 1 but could go up to 500. We use 9 cached values 
geometrically distributed as follows: 
cache[0] = s 
cache[1] = H
246
(s) 
cache[2] = H
374
(s) 
cache[3] = H
438
(s) 
cache[4] = H
470
(s) 
cache[5] = H
486
(s) 
cache[6] = H
494
(s) 
cache[7] = H
498
(s) 
cache[8] = H
500
(s) 
The first transaction uses cache[8]= H
500
(s) and will not need to perform any hash 
operations. The second and third transactions use cache[7]= H
498
(s), resulting in performing one 
hash operation for the second transaction and no operation for the third transaction. The 
transactions numbered 4, 5, 6, and 7 use cache[6]= H
494
(s) resulting in performing 3, 2, 1, and 0 
hash operations, respectively for these four transactions. Notice that the cached values are 
anchored at points that are geometrically spaced apart. The difference between the number of 
hash operations performed for cache[8] and cache[7] is 2, between cache[7] and cache[6] is 4, 
between cache[6] and cache[5] is 8, between cache[5] and cache[4] is 16, and so on. As the 
number of transactions in the real session increases, the range of the number of hash operations 
will increase geometrically and high-numbered transactions will need to perform larger number 
of hash operations on average. 
The result of the geometric distribution scheme is to give smaller HCostavg value for 
earlier transactions. Shorter sessions will benefit more from the geometric distribution. 
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In section 3.7, we present the results of our tests to evaluate sparse caching with 
geometric spacing. 
3.3 Energy Consumption 
When designing any authentication protocol for mobile devices, it is important to reduce 
the energy expended by this protocol. According to [81], there are at least three approaches to 
preserving battery life in mobile devices: efficient hardware, accurate knowledge of energy 
consumption of different cryptographic approaches and light weight security mechanisms.  In 
designing our protocol, one of our major goals was to come up with a light security mechanism 
while ensuring the highest cryptographic strength available.  
Energy consumption is largely influenced by the cryptographic hash function used in the 
authentication scheme as different hash functions have different energy consumption levels. The 
authors of [82] conducted an extensive analysis of energy characteristics of various 
cryptographic approaches and found that energy varies according to the cryptographic approach 
utilized. For SHA, SHA1 and HMAC, the energy required to conduct a single operation is 0.75, 
0.76 and 1.16 microjoule/byte, respectively (for a complete list of energy consumption 
characteristics of different cryptographic approaches, please refer to [82]). The level of energy 
consumption by our authentication protocol in a user session is correlated with the value of 
TotalHashCost described in section 3.2.1.  
In section 3.8, we compare the energy consumption of our sparse caching protocol and 
compare it with the case of no caching. It should be noted though that the initialization phase is 
not included in this comparison because it is conducted using an HTTPS. 
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3.4 Evaluation and Performance Results  
To experiment with the sparse caching HACH scheme, we developed a benchmark which 
was written using Java. The benchmark fully implements the one-way hash chain model and the 
different sparse caching configurations.  
In the tests and experiments to evaluate the performance of HACH, we considered 
several situations and different scenarios. Our objective was to simulate real life connections 
which are characterized by differing needs as far as storage and performance are concerned. 
Therefore, we used the benchmark to evaluate the HACH performance with numbers of 
transactions having different ranges: from 1 to 200 for short sessions, from 500 to 2500 for long 
sessions and up to 4000 and 5000 transactions in some tests. We also varied the storage 
availability to make sure that we address different users’ needs. The storage spaces used to 
evaluate performance ranged from 20 to 500 spaces.       
3.4.1 Impact of Cache Size on HACH Performance 
Figure 3.1 shows the impact of cache size on the performance of HACH. The execution 
overhead of HACH is measured by TotalHCost, the total number of hash operations in a session 
including the initial cache setup. The spacing scheme used in Figure 3.1 is the uniform sparse 
caching scheme described in section 3.2.1. The results in Figure 3.1 are obtained from the Java 
testbed and they agree with the cost estimation derived in section 3.2.1. The results clearly show 
that the more cache we have, the less the TotalHCost would be.  
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Figure ‎3-1 Impact of cache size on TotalHCost 
     Figure 3.2 demonstrates the impact of cache size on the average value of the execution 
overhead of one transaction (i.e. HCostavg). Again we see that the more cache we have, the less 
the value of HCostavg. The sparse caching scheme speeds up transaction authentication and helps 
in reducing the turnaround time of user requests. 
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Figure ‎3-2 Impact of cache size on HCostavg 
3.4.2 Cache Space Allocation Policies 
In section 3.2.2, we proposed a Weighted Overhead formula and gave an example of 
three classes for mobile devices used in wireless networks. For Class 1 (high-end laptops with 
plenty of memory), we can afford to allocate large cache memory to get the best benefit of 
HACH. For Classes 2 and 3 (mobile phones with limited capability), the memory allocated to 
cache will be at a lesser level. To investigate the performance of sparse caching on the different 
mobile devices, we used the following two policies for allocating cache memory to a user session 
with N transactions: 
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1- The square root (sqrt) policy which allocates cache_size = (N)
0.5
 for a session with N 
transactions. 
2- The logarithm (log2) policy which allocates cache_size = log2(N) for a session with N 
transactions. 
We have tested a few other policies but we select the above two policies for presentation 
in this dissertation because they nicely suit the classification of mobile devices described in 
section 3.2.2.  The log2 policy is an aggressive policy which reserves more memory and therefore 
can be used for Class 1 devices. The sqrt policy, on the other hand, exhibits a more conservative 
behavior and reserves smaller amount of cache memory, which is suitable for low end mobile 
devices of Class 2 and 3.  Both policies can be multiplied by a scale factor (ranging from a small 
fraction to a large number) to adapt the rate of memory allocation based on the capability of the 
mobile device, e.g., to differentiate between Class 2 and Class 3.   
Figure 3.3 shows the HACH execution overhead and Figure 3.4 shows the HACH storage 
overhead of the sqrt and log2 cache allocation policies. The log2 policy allocates more cache 
space and consequently incurs a much less TotalHCost. The sqrt policy allocates less cache 
space and incurs much higher TotalHCost.  
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Figure ‎3-3 HACH performance with two policies for sparse caching
 
Figure ‎3-4 HACH storage requirements with two policies for sparse caching 
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3.4.3 Effectiveness of Sparse Caching  
In this section, we present the simulation results when we compared the performance of 
HACH with and without sparse caching. Table 3.1 summarizes the results we obtained from tests 
using the square root (sqrt) policy. The Performance Ratio in the last column is the ratio 
TotalHCost with no caching/TotalHCost with sparse caching. The sparse caching scheme 
significantly improves performance of HACH. Sparse caching is able to decrease TotalHCost of 
transactions by an average of approximately 41 times over the six values of N shown in Table 
3.1.  
Table ‎3-1 HACH performance with/without sparse caching using the sqrt policy 
Number of 
Transactions 
TotalHCost 
No Caching 
TotalHCost 
Sparse 
Caching 
Performance 
Ratio 
500 125250 5702 21.97 
1000 500500 16404 30.51 
1500 1125750 29811 37.76 
2000 2001000 45750 43.74 
3000 4501500 83625 53.83 
4000 8002000 127506 62.76 
 
In Figure 3.5, we further illustrate the performance improvement ratio of the HACH 
using sparse caching. The x-axis represents the number of transactions and the left y-axis 
represents the performance improvement ratio associated with every value of N. The right y-axis 
shows the storage requirement for each value of N. We notice that each added cache unit 
decreases the value of TotalHCost. This is intuitive since if we can afford more memory, we 
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would definitely improve performance.  However, in the case of mobile phones and other low-
end mobile devices, the storage may not always be readily available and we need to find a 
compromise between performance and storage.  
 
Figure ‎3-5 HACH performance improvement ratio 
3.4.4 Selecting Cache Size for Mobile Devices 
In order to find the best tradeoff between cache size and performance (measured in 
TotalHCost), we introduced the Weighted Overhead formula  
𝑊𝑂 = 𝑊 × 𝐶𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡      ( ‎3.4 ) 
In the simulation tests, we experimented with different values of w to represent the 
different classes. For Class 1 devices, the value of w was a small value close to zero because 
memory consumption is not a substantial issue with high-end devices. Higher values of w are 
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used for Class 3 devices and lower values are used for Class 2 devices. We ran tests for different 
values of N.   
 
Figure ‎3-6 Weighted Overhead results for N=500 
Figure 3.6 shows the best cache size when the number of transactions is 500. The left y-
axis represents the value of the Weighted Overhead and the right y-axis is the value of 
TotalHCost. The values of weights are w1 = 0.1 representing Class 1 devices, w2 = 12 
representing Class 2 devices and w3=35 representing Class3 devices. The dashed curve is used to 
indicate TotalHCost. We notice that for this particular number of transactions (N=500), a cache 
size of 50 units is the most suitable for Class 3 devices as it exhibits the lowest Weighted 
Overhead value which strikes an acceptable tradeoff between TotalHCost and memory. For 
Class 2 devices, the best cache size is 100. We notice for Class 1 devices represented by w1, the 
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Weighted Overhead curve is very close to the TotalHCost curve, indicating that we should select 
the highest possible cache size C=N, i.e., complete caching of size 500. 
 
Figure ‎3-7 Weighted Overhead results for N=1000 
Figure 3.7 shows the same test but with N=1000. The same w values reported for Figure 
3.6 were used here. For Class 3 devices (w3 curve), the best cache size is slightly over 100. For 
Class 2 devices (w2 curve), the best size of cache is 250. For Class 1 devices (w1 curve), it is 
best to use complete caching of size 1000.   
We further analyzed the performance of sparse caching for HACH using a metric called 
the speedup factor per unit cache (or simply the speedup factor) defined as follows: 
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H1 = the value of TotalHCost without caching, and  
H2 = the value of TotalHCost with sparse caching of size C 
Table 3.2 gives the results for the speedup factor for Class 3 (weight w3=35) when the 
cache size used is the best cache size selected by the Weighted Overhead formula. Table 3.2 
shows that the contribution of one cache unit is captured by a speedup value of approximately 
0.9. As an example for N = 500 transactions and cache size C = 50, each cache unit improves the 
performance by a magnitude of 0.91 and the total cache of size 50 increases performance by a 
magnitude of 45.5 resulting in  decreasing the total number of hashes from 125250 to 2750.  
Table ‎3-2 Speedup factor per unit cache for Class 3 
Number of 
Transactions 
Cache Size H2 H1 Speedup 
500 50 2750 125250 0.91 
1000 100 5500 500500 0.91 
1500 150 8250 1125750 0.91 
2000 250 9000 2001000 0.89 
3000 250 18000 4501500 1.00 
4000 500 18000 8002000 0.89 
 
Table 3.3 shows similar results for Class 2 devices (w2 = 12). The cache sizes used for 
these devices are bigger than those of Class 3. It should be mentioned that for values of N equal 
to 2000 and higher, the weight w2 = 12 gave multiple best cache sizes (giving the same 
Weighted Overhead value). We therefore used a weight value w2 = 15 to pick the specific cache 
size shown in Table 3.3.  
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Table ‎3-3 Speedup factor per unit cache for Class 2 
Number of 
Transactions 
Cache Size H2 H1 Speedup 
500 50 2750 125250 0.91 
1000 100 5500 500500 0.91 
1500 150 8250 1125750 0.91 
2000 250 9000 2001000 0.89 
3000 250 18000 4501500 1.00 
4000 500 18000 8002000 0.89 
For Class 1 devices (w1  0), the Weighted Overhead formula suggests using complete 
caching.  Table 3.4 gives the results for the speedup factor for Class 1 (weight w1  0) when the 
cache size used is equal to the value of N. The speedup factor for Class 1 with complete caching 
is 0.50. 
Table ‎3-4 Speedup factor per unit cache for Class 1 
Number of 
Transactions 
Cache 
Size 
H2 H1 Speedup 
500 500 500 125250 0.50 
1000 1000 1000 500500 0.50 
1500 1500 1500 1125750 0.50 
2000 2000 2000 2001000 0.50 
3000 3000 3000 4501500 0.50 
4000 4000 4000 8002000 0.50 
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3.5 HACH with Non-uniform Cache Spacing 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 give comparisons between sparse caching with uniform spacing and 
with non-uniform spacing. For non-uniform spacing, we allocated 50% of the cache for the first 
20% of transactions, which we call “high priority transactions”.  The other 50% of the cache is 
used to serve the remaining 80% transactions, which we call the low priority (uncertain) 
transactions.  Table 3.5 analyzes the average authentication time (average number of hash 
operations) of a high priority transaction. The non-uniform spacing gives superior (much 
smaller) authentication time compared to the uniform spacing. The last column in Table 3.5 
gives the value of speedup for a high priority transaction. For example when N = 500, the 
average authentication time for a high priority transaction using non-uniform spacing is 1.5 hash 
operations whereas the corresponding figure for uniform spacing is 4.5. This means that high 
priority transactions enjoy a three-fold speedup under the non-uniform spacing scheme compared 
to the uniform spacing scheme. As the number of transactions goes up, the speedup factor 
decreases slightly and becomes equal to 2.55 at N = 4000 
Table ‎3-5 Average speedup for a high-priority transaction 
Number of 
Transactions 
High 
Priority 
Non 
Uniform 
Spacing 
Uniform 
Spacing 
Speedup 
500 100 1.5 4.5 3.00 
1000 200 3.5 9.5 2.71 
1500 300 5.5 14.5 2.64 
2000 400 7.5 19.5 2.60 
3000 600 11.5 29.5 2.57 
4000 800 15.5 39.5 2.55 
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Table 3.6 analyzes the average authentication time (average number of hash operations) 
of a low priority transaction. The non-uniform spacing gives larger (slower) turnaround time 
compared to the uniform spacing. The last column in Table 6 gives the value of the slow-up for a 
low priority transaction.  Notice that the uniform-spacing scheme gives the same speed for both 
high priority transactions (Table 3.5) and low priority transactions (Table 3.6). From Tables 3.5 
and 3.6, we see that the non-uniform caching scheme has positively impacted high-priority 
transactions by a speedup factor of 2.5 or higher and has negatively impacted low-priority 
transactions by a slow-up factor of only 1.67 or less.  
Table ‎3-6 Average slow-up of a low-priority transaction 
Number 
of 
Transactions 
Low Priority 
N 
Non Uniform 
Spacing 
Uniform 
Spacing 
Slow- 
up 
500 400 7.5 4.5 1.67 
1000 800 15.5 9.5 1.63 
1500 1200 23.5 14.5 1.62 
2000 1600 31.5 19.5 1.62 
3000 2400 47.5 29.5 1.61 
4000 3200 63.5 39.5 1.61 
 
3.6 Approximate Knowledge of N 
In the previous sections, we performed our simulation tests assuming that the value of N 
is accurately known. The value of N in most real life applications is not accurately known. A 
minimal level of sparse caching can help the developer apply hash chains of larger length 
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without the fear of any increase in the average or maximum authentication time for a transaction. 
Figure 3.8 shows the impact of using sparse caching with minichain_len set at 1000 for sessions 
with unknown number of transactions exceeding 1000. It can be seen that sparse caching reduces 
HCostavg of transactions when N is not precisely known. For example, when N = 4000 
transactions, the value of HCostavg without sparse caching is approximately 1500. By placing 
only three cache units, the value of HCostavg is reduced to 375. We observed that the reduction in 
HCostavg due to sparse caching increases as the number of transactions increases.   
 
 
Figure ‎3-8 Handling unknown large values of N: comparison between HCostavg with and 
without sparse caching 
3.7 Geometric Spacing 
In section 3.2.5, we introduced the idea of geometric spacing of cache which gives 
smaller HCostavg value for earlier transactions in cases when the exact number of transactions N 
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is not known and could be as small as one and as large as N. The idea involves increasing the 
cache spacing intervals progressively as the real number of transactions increases.    
 
Figure ‎3-9 Comparison of HCostavg between Uniform, Non-Uniform and Geometric 
Spacing 
Figure 3.9 shows the test results for the case when N is not known and the developer has 
chosen the value N = 500 to be the length of the hash chain. The horizontal axis represents the 
real number of transactions, denoted K. The figure compares the performance of the following 
three schemes for values of K = 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 200. 
- Uniform caching with equal spacing as described in section 3.2.1. 
- Non-uniform caching with two groups as described in section 3.2.4.  
- Geometric spacing as described in section 3.2.5.  
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As seen in Figure 3.9, using the geometric spacing policy improves the performance of 
HACH compared to the other two policies when the real number of transactions K is lower than 
50. For the case K = 50, the geometric spacing performs better than uniform spacing and has the 
same performance as the non-uniform spacing policy. For K = 100 transactions, geometric 
spacing still performs better than uniform spacing but worse than non-uniform spacing. The 
geometric spacing scheme does not benefit HACH when K   120 transactions.   
3.8 Energy Consumption  
In section 3.3, we introduced the energy consumption metric used to evaluate the 
performance of our sparse caching protocol. Since the energy consumption is largely influenced 
by the cryptographic hash function used, the type and amount of hashing operations required to 
carry out the authentication of the internet session translate into the energy consumption of the 
authentication scheme. 
Figure 3.10 illustrates the energy consumption comparison between our sparse caching 
based HACH protocol and its counterpart without sparse caching. It should be noted that the 
sparse caching in this comparison is conducted using the sqrt policy and SHA-1 hashing. As can 
be seen in the figure, our sparse caching scheme tremendously improves energy consumption of 
the HACH authentication protocol. It is also noted that the HACH protocol suffers from a huge 
increase in energy consumption making it far from ideal especially for platforms with limited 
energy capacities.  
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Figure ‎3-10 Energy consumption comparison of HACH with and without sparse caching 
3.9 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have shown that the use of lightweight easy to implement sparse 
caching approach can significantly improve the performance of the widely used cryptographic 
one-way hash chain technique to secure session cookies. We introduced a memory-times-
computation complexity metric to help select a best cache size depending on different users’ 
storage requirements. Different cache spacing techniques have been investigated to demonstrate 
different connection behaviors.  
We presented the results of extensive performance tests that have shown the significant 
reduction in authentication cost achieved by the sparse caching schemes. We have also shown 
how to deal with real-life situations in which the number of transactions per user session is 
largely unknown and cannot be accurately estimated.  
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 HACH WITH A HIERARCHICAL TWO-TIER CHAPTER 4:
CONSTRUCTION (TTOHC) 
In this chapter, we present our second contribution to solve the computational overhead 
of the HACH protocol discussed in Chapter Two. The two-tier one-way hash chain protocol 
revolves around utilizing different cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers. The 
TTOHC protocol gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions 
for securing Internet cookies. A detailed Java testbed has been used to evaluate alternative 
configurations for the hierarchical scheme and investigate the optimal set up of the two tiers. 
Detailed performance results obtained from this testbed are presented and analyzed.   
4.1 Proposed Scheme  
A. The Two-Tier One-way Hash Chain (TTOHC) Protocol  
Our TTOHC protocol is based on the idea of utilizing two levels of hashing that use 
different cryptographic hash algorithms, e.g., SHA-1 and HMAC. The OHC (OTC and SCRHC 
[83] are examples of OHC) scheme has a single one-way hash chain and the length of this chain 
represents the number of transactions N. The TTOHC scheme, on the other hand, has a single 
first-tier chain and multiple second-tier chains. The variable N is divided into two components: 
the length of the first-tier chain Nf and the length of the second-tier chain Ns. Although we will 
primarily focus on the static case where all second-tier chains have the same length Ns, we will 
also present results on the dynamic case in which the length of the second-tier chain changes 
linearly.  
The TTOHC protocol is composed of three routines: Initialization, 
Authenticate_Transaction, and Adjust_Seed. In the Initialization routine, a shared secret value S0, 
the number of transactions N and length of the second-tier chain Ns are selected and exchanged 
 58 
between the server and the client. The authentication tokens transmitted in the cookies are 
generated by the Authenticate_Transaction routine using the second-tier hash function HS. These 
authentication tokens are denoted Vi,j where V represents the authentication token, i refers to the 
first-tier index and j refers to the second-tier index. Each time the length of the second-tier hash 
chain is exhausted, the Adjust_Seed routine is used to compute the new seed for the next second-
tier chain. The new seeds are computed using the first-tier hash function HF.  In what follows, 
we give the notations and more details of the TTOHC protocol.  
N= number of transactions in the session 
Nf = length of the first-tier chain 
Ns = length of the second-tier chain assuming the static case 
N ≤  Nf   Ns ;    ideally  N = Nf   Ns 
HF is the hash function used in the first-tier 
HS is the hash function used in the second-tier 
S0= Initial seed used by the first-tier chain 
In our tests we used a message authentication code HMAC for HF and a hash function 
SHA-1 for HS.  The values generated in the first-tier are denoted S1, S2, S3, etc., and are used as 
seeds for the second-tier chains as shown below.  
S1 = HF
Nf
(S0), S2 = HF
Nf -1
(S0),....., SNf-1 = HF
2
(S0), SNf = HF(S0) 
In our testbed, the HMAC algorithm used to implement HF uses two arguments: a seed 
S0 and a message g; therefore, we created another argument g during initialization (g is the string 
“first-tier”). The values generated in the second-tier chain are the authentication tokens used in 
the authentication step for the successive transactions of a user’s session. User transactions 
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numbered 1 to Ns use the tokens generated by the first second-tier chain based on the seed S1, 
transactions numbered Ns+1 to 2Ns use the tokens generated by the second second-tier chain 
based on S2 and so on.  Specifically, the first transaction uses the token value V1,1 = HS
Ns
(S1) . 
The second transaction usesV1,2 = HS
Ns-1
(S1) and the transaction numbered NS uses the token V1,Ns 
= HS(S1). The token V1,Ns  is the last token generated using the seed S1. For the next transaction, 
numbered NS +1, the routine Adjust_Seed is invoked to compute the new seed S2 for the second 
second-tier chain. After calling the Adjust_Seed routine, transaction numbered NS +1 uses the 
authentication token V2,1 = HS
Ns
(S2) . The pseudo codes for the three routines are given below.   
Initialization: 
The initialization stage takes place using an HTTPS connection. During the HTTPS 
authentication, the initial value of the shared secret S0, a message g, the length of the hash chain 
N and the length of the second-tier chain Ns  are selected and exchanged between the server and 
the client. The following code is executed at both the client and the server. 
Nf := N ÷Ns        // length of the first-tier chain 
L:= Ns              // L is the global index for the second-tier chain 
J:= Nf               // J  is the global index for the first-tier chain  
S:= HF
J
(S0)   // S is now S1=seed for the first second-tier chain  
The routine Authenticate_Transaction generates the authentication token V at the client 
side. The authentication token is generated by the second-tier hash function HS. The token V is 
then transmitted in the cookie of the transaction to the server where a similar routine is executed 
to compute the value V at the server. The server compares the received value and the computed 
value to authenticate the transaction.  
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Authenticate_Transaction(S,L) 
Begin 
V:= HS
L
(S)  // L is the global index for the second-tier chain 
L:= L -1 
if (L==0) then  
     S:= Call Adjust_Seed( ) 
     L:= Ns;  end_if 
Return (V);  
End 
For example, if N=500 transactions and Ns=100, then Nf = 5 and the authentication tokens 
will be computed as follows: 
1
st
 transaction uses token V1,1 = HS
100
(S1), 
2
nd
 transaction uses token V1,2 = HS
99
(S1), 
….…., 
100
th
 transaction uses token V1,100 = HS(S1), 
101
st
 transaction uses tokenV2,1 = HS
100
(S2),  
102
nd
 transaction uses token V2,2 = HS
99
(S2),  
…….., 
200
th
 transaction uses token V2,100 = HS(S2),  
…….., 
401
st
 transaction uses token V5,1 = HS
100
(S5),  
……...., 
500
th
 transaction uses token V5,100 = HS(S5), 
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The Adjust_Seed routine generates the seeds for the second-tier chains using the first-tier 
hash function HF as given blow.  
Adjust_Seed( ) 
Begin 
J := J-1     // J  is the global index for the first-tier chain 
S:= HF
J
(S0);   
Return (S) 
End 
4.2 Performance Results 
To evaluate the proposed TTOHC protocol and investigate its optimal setup, we wrote a 
detailed benchmark in Java. We used a metric, SessionCost, which is the total cost of the hash 
operations in both the first-tier chain and all second-tier chains during the entire lifetime of the 
session. In the SessionCost metric, the unit cost is normalized to be the cost of a hashing 
operation computed by SHA-1 (the cost of HMAC is higher). We use this metric as an indicator 
of the computational overhead. The higher the SessionCost is, the higher the computational 
overhead associated with transmission of cookies. We conducted extensive tests to account for 
different real life scenarios including long sessions in which the user opts for the ‘remember me’ 
option offered by many web applications. In our experiments, we took into consideration the 
discrepancy of session length in real life and so approximated the results. The results are an 
average of 1000 simulations. Below we present and analyze our performance results.  
A. Comparison between TTOHC and OHC 
Figure 4.1 compares the performance of the TTOHC protocol with the non-hierarchical 
OHC scheme for different values of N.  In Figure 4.1, the TTOHC protocol used the same 
second-tier chain length Ns=20 for all values of N. It is easy to see that TTOHC outperforms 
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OHC by a wide margin. The cost comparison indicates that the TTOHC protocol decreases the 
computational overhead represented by the metric SessionCost tremendously. For example when 
the session has N=500 transactions, the session cost of OHC is 250, whereas the corresponding 
cost of TTOHC is approximately 13. The difference in performance grows as the number of 
transactions increases showing the benefit of our proposed scheme.  
 
Figure ‎4-1 Comparison between OHC and TTOHC (Ns=20) 
To further illustrate the benefit of the TTOHC over OHC, we plotted (in Figure 4.2) the 
performance improvement ratio between the session cost of TTOHC and the session cost of 
OHC. The performance improvement ratio ranges from 21 at N=500 to 83 at N=3000. The 
average improvement ratio of TTOHC over OHC in Figure 4.2 is 56. The two-tier one-way hash 
chain scheme achieves great performance gain and significantly reduces the computational 
overhead of the OHC scheme.  
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We next investigate the problem of how to select the value of the length of the second-
tier chain Ns. The value of Ns, selected during initialization, affects the length of the first-tier 
chain Nf and significantly impacts performance of the TTOHC protocol.  
 
Figure ‎4-2 TTOHC to OHC Performance Improvement Ratio in the Static case 
B.  Selecting Ns in the Static Case  
In the static case, the value of Ns is set up during initialization and is not changed 
throughout the duration of the session. Once the first second-tier chain is exhausted and the 
Adjust_Seed is called to generate the seed for the next second-tier chain, the value of Ns is reset 
to its original value selected during initialization. This is repeated for all second-tier chains until 
the session is completed.  
The performance of the TTOHC protocol when Ns is static is illustrated in Figure 4.3 
which plots SessionCost versus Ns. 
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Figure ‎4-3 TTOHC Performance for static Ns 
Figure 4.3 shows that the performance of TTOHC is optimal when the value of Ns is 
between 20 to 25. This means that we should select the hash chain length of the second-tier chain 
to be in the range 20-25. In fact, the value Ns = 20 tends to strike a good balance for minimizing 
SessionCost over all values of N.  It should be noted that the value Ns = 20 is only optimal for the 
particular setup we used in our tests, i.e., when HMAC is used to implement HF in the first-tier 
chain and SHA-1 is used to implement HS in all second-tier chains. Choosing different hash 
function will certainly change the optimal chain length value. For example, when we swapped 
the two functions and used the more expensive HMAC in the second-tier chains and SHA-1 in 
the first-tier chain, the optimal value of Ns was found to be around 10.   
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C.  Dynamic Ns 
We also investigated the use of dynamic values for Ns, i.e., the length of the second-tier 
chain is not always the same. In this case, the value of Ns dynamically changes each time the 
Adjust_Seed routine is called. There are several options of dynamic Ns configurations, but we 
will report the results of the case when Ns increases linearly. The linear increase of the value of 
Ns means that an initial value Ns is selected for the first second-tier chain and is increased by a 
certain amount in the successive chains.  In our tests we used an initial value Init_Ns = Ns as the 
length of the first second-tier chain, 2*Ns as the length of the second second-tier chain, 3*Ns as 
the length of the third second-tier chain and so on until the session is completed. In order to 
account for this increase, we modified the code of the Initialization routine so that we can 
compute the length of the first-tier chain Nf needed to produce the seeds for the second-tier 
chains in the dynamic case. We also modified the Adjust_Seed routine by letting it handle the 
dynamic Ns update as follows:  
Adjust_Seed( ) 
Begin 
Ns:= Ns + Init_Ns   // Ns increases linearly 
J:= J-1  
S:= HF
J
(S0);  
Return (S) 
End  
 
To illustrate this, let us examine how the code works to handle N = 500 transactions when 
Ns is linearly updated. Below we give the authentication token values produced for the 
successive transactions when N = 500, Init_Ns = 2 and the length of second-tier chain increases 
linearly as explained above. The Initialization routine uses the values N = 500 and Init_Ns = 2 to 
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compute the maximum possible value of Nf (i.e. the number of times the seed is going to be 
updated). The maximum value of Nf in this case is 22 (i.e., there are 22 second-chair chains 
needed to cover all 500 transactions.) The following are the authentication tokens for the 
dynamic case when the initial value of Ns is 2. 
V1,1 = HS
2
(S1) 
V1,2 = HS
1
(S1) 
V2,1 = HS
4
(S2) 
V2,2 = HS
3
(S2) 
V2,3 = HS
2
(S2) 
V2,4 = HS (S2) 
…. 
V22,38 = HS
7
(S22) 
 
In the above example, the first transaction (with token V1,1)  performs two hash 
operations. The second transaction (with token V1,2)  performs one hash operation. Then, the 
value Ns has to be updated by the Adjust_Seed routine to Ns = 4 and a new seed S2 is computed. 
By the 500
th
 transaction, we will have updated the value of Ns twenty two times. 
Figure 4.4 shows how linearly increasing Ns impacts the performance of the TTOHC 
protocol. Here, we can see that if we start Ns from a low value (e.g. Init_Ns = 1 or 2), we achieve 
better performance. If the initial value of Ns starts at a relatively high value, say 20, the protocol 
suffers from a large overhead as the SessionCost tends to be high. So, a low initial value of 
Init_Ns = 1 or 2 would be the best choice for the dynamic case with linear increase.   
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Figure ‎4-4 TTOHC performance when Ns changes linearly 
The performance (SessionCost) of TTOHC with the dynamic configuration for Ns is 
relatively higher than the static configuration. Nevertheless, this dynamic configuration still 
results in a much better performance than the OHC scheme. Figure 4.5 demonstrates how the 
TTOHC scheme with dynamic configuration outperforms the OHC by a large ratio.  Comparing 
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.5, we see that the static configuration gives better performance 
improvement ratio than the dynamic configuration, especially at high values of N.  Figure 4.6 
gives a comparison between the two TTOHC configurations.  In Figure 4.6, we used the optimal 
value of Ns for both configurations, i.e., Ns = 20 for the static configuration and Init_Ns = 1 for 
the dynamic configuration. As shown in the figure, the performance of the two configurations is 
comparable when the number of transactions is low, but the static configuration tends to 
outperform its dynamic counterpart at higher number of transactions.  
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Although the dynamic configuration does not match the performance of the static one, it 
has some practical merit when the value of N is not known and has a wide range that extends 
from a very small number to a large number. In this case, the dynamic TTOHC configuration 
would be practically acceptable because the early (more certain) transactions would be 
authenticated by second-tier chains of small lengths (e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8) and are therefore given good 
performance.  
 
Figure ‎4-5 Dynamic TTOHC Performance Improvement Ratio 
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Figure ‎4-6 TTOHC performance with static and dynamic Ns 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a protocol for the efficient authentication of session cookies. 
Our protocol uses two tiers of one-way hash chains to reduce the overhead of the flat one-way 
hash chain significantly. Our testbed for the proposed scheme used two good cryptographic hash 
functions (HAMC for first-tier hashing and SHA-1 for second-tier hashing). The use of 
cryptographically strong hash functions is recommended to increase the resistance of the scheme 
to collision and per-image attacks.  
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 HACH FOR COLLABORATIVE AND SOCIAL MEDIA CHAPTER 5:
NETWORKS 
5.1 Introduction 
The use of insecure cookies as a means to authenticate web transactions in collaborative 
and social media websites presents a hazard to users’ privacy. In this chapter, we propose and 
evaluate a novel protocol for protecting transmitted cookies using two dimensional one-way hash 
chains. In the first dimension, there is a hash chain that computes secret values used in the 
second dimension hash function. Multiple hash chains use the secret values created by the first 
dimension to authenticate session cookies in the second dimension. For improved security, the 
hashing operations in the second dimension use a concatenation of the secret values and the 
position index of the hash function within the hash chain. The performance of the scheme is 
evaluated using a detailed simulation testbed and an analytical model. The optimal lengths of the 
chains are derived when the number of transactions in the session is known. The protocol is 
extended to efficiently handle the case when the number of transactions is not known. The 
evaluation of the proposed scheme reveals that it achieves tremendous improvement over 
straightforwardly configured one-way hash chain schemes. Also, by adopting the position-
indexed hashing protocol, energy consumption is reduced significantly especially with longer 
sessions making our protocol ideal for battery operated devices. 
In designing our protocol, we took into consideration different cryptographic approaches. 
While one of our main objectives is reducing the computational overhead of one-way hash 
chains based cookies, we wanted our protocol to benefit from the features of current 
cryptographic approaches especially their strength and resistance to replay attacks, collision 
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attacks, pre-image attacks and second pre-image attacks. Hence, our protocol is designed with 
the state-of-the art cryptographic approaches in mind.  
5.2 The Proposed Protocol 
A. Conceptualization  
Conceptually, the one way hash chains in our protocol are arranged in two dimensions 
(Figure 5.1). In the first dimension (i.e. horizontal axis), there is a single hash chain that 
computes the seeds for the second dimension chains (i.e. vertical axis). In the second dimension, 
multiple hash chains use these seeds to generate authentication tokens. The authentication tokens 
are derived by hashing the seeds and the position of the hashing functions in the hash chains (e.g. 
via a concatenation process ||). Given the cryptographic hash function used is resistant to attacks 
(e.g. SHA-1, SHA-2 or SHA-3), a slight change in the argument to be hashed is expected to 
result in a significantly different output. Figure 5.1 provides a conceptual view of how the 
proposed protocol functions.  
 
Figure ‎5-1 Position-indexed hashing for 12 transactions TChain_Len= 3, SChain_Len= 4 
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The proposed protocol is composed of three main stages: the Initialization stage, 
Authenticate_Token stage and Next_Seed stage. The notations we use in our scheme are 
summarized in Table 5.1.  
1) Initialization stage 
During the initialization stage, which is done using an HTTPS protocol, information 
about the session length (i.e., number of transactions N), an initial secret S0 and TChain_Len is 
exchanged between the server and the client. Once this information is exchanged, the 
SChain_Len is determined by dividing N by TChain_Len. The result of this division will give us 
the number of seeds that will be needed during an internet session. Our definition of a session 
refers to the communication activities between the web application and the client during the 
login time (i.e. between log-in and log-out). A transaction on the other hand is a set of request 
and response between the web application and the client. The session is composed of N 
transactions. Information about the session length, TChains are predetermined and exchanged 
during this stage. 
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Table ‎5-1 Notations used in the proposed scheme 
Notations Description 
N Number of transactions to be handled during an internet session. 
SChain The chain where seeds are generated. 
TChain The chain where authentication tokens are generated. 
S0 The initial seed used by the SChain 
SChain_Len Length of the SChain. 
TChain_Len Length of the TChain. 
H
 
Hash function used to generate seeds or authentication tokens. 
V Authentication token. 
 
2) Authenticate_Token stage  
The next stage Authenticate_Token, is where the authentication tokens are actually 
produced. The authentication tokens are denoted Vi,j where the variable i  represents the current  
TChain and j represents the current transaction number within the TChain. The tokens are 
created by hashing the seed concatenated || with a variable indicating the position of the hash 
function in the TChain.  This position indexing technique is a well-known technique for boosting 
security because Birthday Attacks can be avoided if all hash functions used are indexed by their 
position in the chain [80]. As will be explained in the Next_Seed stage, we also update the seed 
several times during the session. The number of times the seed is updated depends on the number 
of transactions and the value of TChain_Len. This number is used to indicate how many TChains 
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we will have during the session. In other words, each updated seed is only used by the 
transactions of one TChain and then discarded and never used again.  
3) Next_Seed stage  
The third component of the protocol is the Next_Seed routine. This routine is responsible 
for updating the seeds used in the TChains to generate authentication tokens. It should be noted 
that each TChain has its own seed. This routine is invoked once the authentication tokens of the 
first TChain are created and transmitted. Based on the number of transactions and TChain_Len 
exchanged in the initialization stage, we know the number of times the seed is expected to be 
updated. The length of the seed chain, SChain_Len, is a result of dividing the number of 
transactions N by the value TChain_Len. Once the authentication tokens have all used a seed 
once (i.e. TChain_Len is exhausted), the Next_Seed routine is invoked to produce an updated 
seed for the next authentication token chain; TChain. We illustrate in the following section how 
our protocol works with a pseudo code and detailed examples. The performance evaluation 
results of the proposed scheme are presented in sections 5.3 and 5.4.  
B. Selecting a Cryptographic Hash Function  
A cryptographic hash function is an algorithm which changes a certain set of data into a 
string of a fixed size, called the block size. Examples of cryptographic hash functions include 
MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2. It was proven that the MD5 hash function is prone to collision 
attacks [84] , [85] as well as pre-image attacks [86], and therefore, we did not consider it in our 
scheme. While SHA-1 is resistant to pre-image attacks, it was proven by [87] that it is 
theoretically prone to collision attacks. However, since it is not practically susceptible to 
collision attacks, we have used it in our protocol for the purpose of illustration. 
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In our implementation, the original block size is 160-bit corresponding to SHA-1, but it 
can easily be expanded to accommodate stronger cryptographic techniques that require larger 
block sizes such as SHA-2 (in all its sizes) and SHA-3 once it is released by NIST.  
5.3 Case of Known Number of Transactions  
Accurate statistics about network traffic related to social networking sites can be helpful 
in identifying the length of the one-way hash chain. However, it is not always the case that these 
are readily available. Dacosta et al [10] conducted basic traffic analysis of the social networking 
site “Facebook” and concluded that a typical session requires hundreds of transactions, and thus 
they set their chain length at 1000. In our study, we have varied this chain length since different 
social networking sites might have different requirements.  Following are the steps of the 
protocol when the number of transactions is known.   
5.4 The Proposed Protocol’s Steps 
The initialization stage takes place using an HTTPS connection. During the HTTPS 
authentication, the initial value of the secret key S0, the number of transactions N and the length 
of TChain (i.e. TChain_Len) are selected and exchanged between the server and the client. The 
following code is executed at both the client and the server sides. 
SChain_Len:= N ÷ TChain_Len    // length of the SChain  
I:= SChain_Len                           //  I is the global index for the SChain  
J:= TChain_Len                       // J is the global index for the TChain                                
Seed:= H
I
(S0)                          // Seed is now Seed1=seed for the first TChain  
 
The routine Authenticate_Token is executed once for each transaction to compute the 
authentication tokens that will be transmitted with the transaction cookie.  
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Authenticate_Token(Seed, J) 
Begin 
            V:= HJ(Seed||J )     // J is the global index for the TChain where || is a concatenation of  
           the seed   with the hash function position in the chain 
J:= J -1    
if (J==0) then                    // TChain length is exhausted 
   Seed:= Call Next_Seed( )          // Seed has to be updated 
  J:= TChain_Len                  // TChain length is reset 
end-if            
Return (V) 
End 
Next_Seed( ) 
Begin 
I:= I-1                             // I  is the global index for the  SChain 
Seed:= H
I
(S0)                   // updating the Seed value 
Return (Seed) 
End;  
Let us now illustrate how the protocol works with an example. In case the number of 
transactions is known to be N =200, and the TChain_Len =4, the seed is going to be updated 50 
times (i.e., SChain_Len = 50)  to carry out the hashing functions for 200 transactions.   
We have  I=50, J=4, Seed1= H
50
(S0) 
The first TChain of four transactions will create the following authentication tokens.  
V1,1= H
4
(Seed1||4)  
V1,2= H
3
(Seed1||3)  
V1,3= H
2
(Seed1||2)  
V1,4= H
1
(Seed1||1)  
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Once these authentication tokens have been transmitted, the Seed has to be updated to     
Seed2= H
49
(S0) and J has to be reset to 4. 
The next step is to generate the second set of four transactions which will be: 
V2,1= H
4
(Seed2||4)  
…….. 
V2,4= H
1
(Seed2||1)  
The code continues to calculate the authentication tokens in each TChain until we reach 
the 50
th
 TChain. The 50
th
 TChain will have the Seed50= H(S0)  and its authentication tokens will 
be:  
V50,1= H
4
(Seed50||4) 
…….. 
V50,4= H
1
(Seed50||1)  
5.5 Protocol Evaluation  
1) The Testbed 
In this section, we present the protocol evaluation results when the number of 
transactions in a session is known. We developed a detailed benchmark in Java which allowed us 
to test different session scenarios. An important metric used in our tests is SessionCost which is 
the total number of hash operations performed during the lifetime of the session. The metric 
SessionCost represents the overall execution overhead of the protocol including the overhead of 
the  Initialization stage and the overhead of the Authenticate_Token routine for all transactions as 
well as the overhead of the Next_Seed routine.  
Figure 5.2 shows the performance of the protocol for different values of the number of 
transactions N and the length of TChain. It is interesting to see that the value of SessionCost 
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decreases as the value of TChain_Len increases until a certain point then starts to increase again. 
For each value of N, there is a certain value of TChain_Len that minimizes the value of 
SessionCost. We validate this behavior by an analytical model. 
 
Figure ‎5-2 Protocol Evaluation (known number of transactions) 
2) Analytical Model 
As we described earlier our protocol is composed of two chains: i) the seed generating 
chain SChain represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 5.1, and ii) the authentication 
generating chain TChain represented by the vertical (slanted) axis in Fig 5.1. For simplicity, we 
assume that the cost of a single hash operation used in the SChain and TChain is the same 
because they both use the same hashing algorithm (i.e. SHA-1); we will examine this assumption 
later at the end of this section. The cost of a single session SessionCost= C is the sum of the 
hashing operations required to generate authentication tokens in the vertical chains, CV,  and the 
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hashing operations required to update the seeds in the horizontal chain, CH. Here is how 
SessionCost is calculated. 
N= number of transactions 
M= SChain_Len 
K= TChain_Len  
Cost of one vertical chain = 
𝐾(𝐾+1)
2
        ( ‎5.1 ) 
CV = 
𝑀𝐾(𝐾+1)
2
 = 
𝑁(𝐾+1)
2
         ( ‎5.2 ) 
CH =  
𝑀(𝑀+1)
2
            ( ‎5.3 ) 
C = CV + CH 
    = 
𝐾(𝐾+1)
2
 + 
𝑀(𝑀+1)
2
         ( ‎5.4 ) 
C = 
𝑁(𝐾+1)
2
 + 
𝑀(𝑀+1)
2
 = 
𝑁𝐾
2
 + 
𝑁
2
 + 
𝑀2 
2
 + 
𝑀
2
      ( ‎5.5 ) 
The next formula can be used to plot C as a function of N and K.  
C =  
𝑁𝐾
2
 + 
𝑁
2
 + 
𝑁2 
2𝐾2 
 + 
𝑁
2𝐾
 =(𝐾 + 1 +
𝑁
𝐾2 
+
1
𝐾
)      ( ‎5.6 )
   
 
To find the optimal value of K which minimizes the cost C, we differentiate formula 5.6 
and equate to 0 
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐾
=  
𝑁
2
(1 −
2𝑁
𝐾3 
−
1
𝐾2 
)        ( ‎5.7 ) 
(1 −
2𝑁
𝐾3 
−
1
𝐾2 
) = 0         ( ‎5.8 ) 
𝐾3 − 𝐾 − 2𝑁 = 0         ( ‎5.9 ) 
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 Equation 5.9 can be used to derive the optimal value of K which corresponds to 
TChain_Len. Table 5.2 gives the optimal value of TChain_Len obtained by solving the above 
cubic equation numerically. 
Table ‎5-2 TChain_Len OPTIMAL VALUE 
Number of 
Transactions 
Optimal 
TChain_Len 
500 10.03 
1000 12.625 
1500 14.445 
2000 15.895 
Comparing Table 5.2 with Figure 5.2, we can see that the TChain optimal values which 
we obtained from the simulation are very close to the optimal values obtained from the analytical 
solution. 
It should be mentioned that the above analytical solution was derived based on the 
assumption that the hash operation used in the SChain and TChain have the same cost because 
both use the same hash function SHA-1.  A more accurate model can be easily developed to 
account for the extra overhead of the concatenation operation used in the SChain. Since the cost 
of the concatenation operation is much smaller than the cost of  the hash operation, the slight 
increase due to concatenation  can be accurately modeled by multiplying the cost of CH by a 
factor r which is slightly larger than 1.  This will cause Equation 2 to be slightly modified as 
follows: the second and third terms will be multiplied by the factor r. Solving this modified 
equation gives optimal values very close to those given in Table 5.2. 
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5.6 Protocol Comparison with OHC 
In order to validate the efficiency of our protocol, we compared its performance with the 
OHC protocol proposed in [10].  
 
 
Figure ‎5-3 Performance comparison between position-index hashing (PIH) and OHC 
In Figure 5.3, we demonstrate the performance comparison between our protocol and the 
OHC protocol. We compared the average cost of a single transaction in both protocols. In our 
protocol, we were able to lower the average cost of the transaction tremendously. For instance, 
for 500 transactions the average transaction cost of the OHC protocol is 250, whereas our 
protocol lowers this average to a little over 11. While this average tends to increase significantly 
with the increase in transaction numbers for the OHC protocol, our average stays relatively low 
even with N= 2500 transactions where the average cost is 13.65. 
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In order to further gain insight in the benefits of adopting our protocol, we measured the 
performance improvement ratio when our protocol is chosen over the OHC. The performance 
improvement ratio is defined as the ratio SessionCost of OHC : SessionCost of our PIH protocol.  
Figure 5.4 displays the significant improvement our protocol achieves over OHC.  
 
Figure ‎5-4 Performance improvement ratio of OHC 
Looking at Figure 5.4, we can easily gain insight on how choosing our protocol is 
beneficial. Our protocol outperforms the OHC protocol by a little over 22 times when the 
number of transactions is 500. This improvement ratio is much higher with higher transaction 
numbers. When we have 2500 transactions to be handled in a session, our protocol outperforms 
the OHC by over 91 times. This is a relatively wide margin and makes our protocol plausible. 
The ratio is expected to be higher for longer sessions with higher transaction numbers. 
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5.7 Unknown Number of Transactions 
A. Certainty versus Uncertainty in Transaction Number 
In designing the protocol, we took into consideration the possibility of certain versus 
uncertain number of transactions. More often than not, it is very hard to estimate the exact 
number of transactions to be handled in a single session in a social networking site. As we have 
seen above in our discussion of Facebook session length statistics introduced in [10], the length 
can range from a few hundred transactions to several hundreds. This has led us to devise two 
different versions of the position-indexed hashing protocol to accommodate the two scenarios: 
known number of transactions and unknown number of transactions.  
We have already accounted for the case of known number of transactions in the previous 
section, and this section is devoted to explicating the case of unknown number of transactions. 
When the number of transactions is unknown, there is no way to calculate the SChain_Len and 
hence the number of TChains in a session. Therefore, we needed to change the code slightly to 
account for this discrepancy. During the Initialization stage instead of exchanging the number of 
transactions N and the TChain_Len, the client and server exchange the TChain_Len and another 
value representing the SChain_Len. The importance of SChain_Len specification comes from the 
need to update the seed during the session multiple times. Since the transaction number is 
unknown, we have no way of determining how many times the seed is going to be updated. 
Given this scenario, we are faced with another problem. If the specified SChain_Len is not long 
enough (i.e., the actual number of times we will have to update the seed is more than the value of 
SChain_Len), we will need to repeat using one or more seeds, which could compromise the 
security of the session. To solve this problem, we utilize the number of TChains in a session as 
an index to be attached to the updated seed via a concatenation process ||. The index for TChain 
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number can be derived from the TChain_Len and the Next_Seed routine. The first TChain in a 
session is the one that uses the first seed and once the Next_Seed routine is invoked, the TChain 
index is incremented and the new value is attached to the hashed seed.  
B. The Modified Protocol 
Here, we introduce how we modified the protocol to account for the case of unknown 
number of transactions. We still have the three stages we had in the unknown number of 
transactions case.  
1) Initialization 
The initialization stage takes place using an HTTPS connection. During the HTTPS 
authentication, the initial value of the secret key S0, the length of the authenticate-token chain 
TChain_Len and the length of the next-seed chain SChain_Len are selected and exchanged 
between the server and the client. The following code is executed at both the client and the server 
sides. 
I:= SChain_Len               // I is the global index for the SChain   
J:= TChain_Len            //J is the global index for the TChain              
index:= 1                      //a global variable indicating TChain 
                          number where 1 refers to first TChain  
Seed:= H
I
(S0||index)     // Seed is now Seed1=seed for the first 
                                        TChain 
 
Authenticate_Token(Seed, J) 
Begin    
V:= H
J
(Seed||J )                           // J is the global index for the TChain  
J:= J -1 
if (J==0) then                             // TChain_Len length is exhausted  
    index:= index + 1                   // index incremented for the next TChain 
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    Seed:= Call Next_Seed( )      // Seed has to be updated 
    J:= TChain_Len                   // TChain length is reset 
end-if      
Return (V) 
End 
Next_Seed( )  
Begin 
I:= I-1  
if (I==0) then                    // SChain length is exhausted 
   I:= SChain_Len             // I is reset to SChain_Len  
end-if   
Seed:= H
I
(S0||index);  
Return (Seed) 
End  
Here is an example to help illustrate how the protocol handles the transmission of 
authentication tokens when the number of transactions is unknown. During initialization, the 
values of TChain_Len=4 and SChain_Len=10 will be selected and exchanged between the 
server and client. 
We have I=10, J=4, index=1. We assign an index which represents the first
 
TChain, and 
therefore the first seed will be: 
Seed1= H
10
(S0|| 1)  
The first TChain will use Seed1 in the hashing function to derive the first set of 
authentication tokens as follows… 
V1,1= H
4
(Seed1||4) 
V1,2= H
3
(Seed1||3) 
V1,3= H
2
(Seed1||2) 
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V1,4= H
1
(Seed1||1) 
Now index becomes 2 which represents the second TChain, I =9, Seed has to be updated 
to Seed2= H
9
(S0||2) and J has to be reset to 4.The second TChain will have the following 
authentication tokens: 
V2,1=H
4
(Seed2||4) 
            …….. 
V2,4= H
1
(Seed2||1) 
After finishing ten TChains (i.e. 40 transactions) index becomes 11 which represents the 
11
th
 TChain,  I has to be reset to 10, Seed has to be updated to Seed11= H
10
(S0||11) and J has to be 
also reset to 4. If we did not use the TChain number as a value attached to S0 , we would have 
been forced to recycle Seed1 as Seed11=Seed1=H
10
(S0). This could potentially compromise our 
protocol as it becomes easier to detect the initial seed. By indexing the TChain number and using 
its value in the hashing function, we are able to solve this problem.    
Therefore, the 11
th
 TChain (11
th
 set of four transactions) will have authentication tokens 
which will be:  
V11,1= H
4
(Seed11||4) 
…….. 
V11,4= H
1
(Seed11||1) 
The protocol goes on according to this routine until the user or the server terminates the 
session.   
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C. Protocol Evaluation (unknown number of transactions) 
In this section, we present the evaluation of our protocol when the number of transactions 
is unknown. Figure 5.5 illustrates the results when the SChain_Len is fixed at 5, while Figure 5.6 
demonstrates the protocol’s performance when the SChain_Len is fixed at 20. Our main goal 
from this is to determine the best value of TChain_Len where the protocol performs relatively 
well.  
In both Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, regardless of the SChain_Len, the protocol seems to 
perform well when the TChain_Len is set at 3. Unlike the case of known number of transactions 
where we noticed some kind of correlation between TChain_Len and performance, in the case of 
unknown number of transactions it is better to set TChain_Len at a relatively low value.  
 
Figure ‎5-5 Protocol Evaluation (Unknown number of transactions) SChain_Len= 5 all 
the time 
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Figure ‎5-6 Protocol Evaluation (Unknown number of transactions) SChain_Len= 20 all 
the time 
Our next task was to see what the best value of SChain_Len is when the TChain_Len is 
fixed at 3. The next graph (Figure 5.7) represents the session cost of different number of 
transactions with TChain_Len= 3 and different SChain_Len values. 
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Figure ‎5-7 Protocol performance comparison when TChain_Len=3 and different 
SChain_Len 
Figure 5.7 indicates that there is a steady and direct relationship between SChain_Len and 
performance measured in SessionCost. The lower the value SChain_Len, the better performance 
we can achieve when we do not know the number of transactions during a session. In other 
words, we need to start with relatively short chains in both the authenticate-token chain TChain 
and the next-seed chain SChain.   
5.8 Conclusion 
One-way hash chains can be efficiently used in collaborative and social media networks 
to overcome the problem of session hijacking in Internet sessions caused by stealing cookies. In 
this chapter, we proposed a one-way hash chain protocol to address the problem of 
overestimating the number of transactions during a session in the straightforwardly configured 
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one-way hash chains. Our solution achieves its goal by utilizing two one-way hash chains; one is 
responsible for updating the secret and the other for creating the authentication tokens attached to 
the cookies using the secrets produced by the first chain. We also employ the position of the 
hashing function in the chain in order to strengthen our protocol against attacks such as Birthday 
attacks.   
Our extensive evaluation of the protocol and comparison with other protocols yielded 
encouraging results. We have been able to improve the performance of one-way hash chains 
significantly while keeping the same levels of security. 
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 HACH FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS  CHAPTER 6:
6.1 Introduction 
Different aspects of WSN security have been addressed in the literature. Among the 
problems are user authentication [45], [46], [48], [49], and broadcast authentication [47], [88]. 
WSN security solutions have a general goal of improving WSN standards in terms of 
authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. Conventional user and broadcast authentication 
mechanisms are not as practical in WSNs due to the scarcity of memory and energy capacities of 
sensor nodes.  
Conversely, one of the best solutions for user and broadcast authentication is the use of 
public-keys to secure communication. For example, Benenson et al. proposed a solution in which 
user authentication is achieved by adopting public-key cryptography [45]. They basically use a 
certificate/signature generated by a base station. What renders this technique impractical for 
WSN is the high computation cost and large signature size. In addition, they make WSN 
susceptible to DOS attacks draining energy resources. To remedy this problem, shortened public-
key based solutions designed for WSNs have been suggested. Addressing the problem of 
expensive user authentication if public-keys are used, Wang et al. suggested using a short public 
key whose lifetime is much shorter than regular public keys [47]. This solution aims at reducing 
computation, but it still suffers from vulnerability to DOS attacks.  
The HACH protocol has been considered by several researchers as an efficient 
mechanism to achieve user authentication in wireless sensor networks. One of the seminal papers 
to take this route is the 𝜇TESLA scheme introduced in [89] which aimed at achieving broadcast 
authentication. In 𝜇TESLA, the basic idea is to have a base station, assumed to be trusted all the 
time, that acts as a user of sensor nodes services, i.e. the base station is where sensed information 
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is collected and authenticated. Authentication is achieved by using one-way hash function h() 
and using the hash preimages as keys in the Message Authentication Code (MAC). In the 
initialization stage, the base station calculates a hashed value of a secret x based on the number 
of nodes in the network and distributes it among relative sensor nodes in a unicast fashion. In the 
subsequent transactions, a preimage of the hashed value is used as a key in MAC. In the next 
stage, the sensors verify whether or not the hashed value and its preimage are consistent. The 
problem with this technique is low scalability and the high computational cost due the unicast 
nature of key distribution. To further improve 𝜇TESLA, Liu and Ning [90] suggested replacing 
the unicast technique for distributing keys with a broadcast based technology.   
One-way hash based solutions have also been attractive in user authentication schemes of 
WSNs. One of the earliest implementations of user authentication employing one-way hash is 
introduced in [91]. The one-way hash operation is used in the initial stages to verify the user 
requesting access to the WSN is an authorized user. Subsequent user authentication schemes 
which try to overcome the shortcoming of [91] include [92], [93] and [94]. Unlike the one-way 
hash chains used in broadcast authentication where computational overhead is an issue of 
concern, user authentication schemes do not suffer from such overhead since we only need one-
way hash operations in the login stages.  
In this chapter, we propose a novel scheme where the HACH approach is extended to 
achieve broadcast authentication in addition to user authentication in WSN’s. The proposed 
scheme uses a mini one-way hash chain protocol for user and broadcast authentication that is as 
effective, while at the same time significantly reducing the computational overhead. We avoid 
the potential security breach by using easily computed one time authentication tokens to secure 
communication. Similar to the previous contributions, the proposed protocol is energy 
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preserving, light and efficient. Our simulation and evaluation tests reflect its benefit over 
straightforwardly configured one-way hash chains. 
6.2 Network Model 
For our protocol, we envision a star topology network where communication between the 
user and the WSN is mediated by a central entity, called coordinator. Essentially, the 
coordinator is a sensor node with special capabilities. The role of the coordinator is to manage 
communication in the WSN by receiving queries from the users, communicating with sensor 
nodes to get the sensed information, and fetching the results of users’ queries back to the user. 
With this in mind, we assume the coordinator to be responsible for authentication in both 
directions. In the user’s direction, the coordinator is expected to only allow identified users 
holding the right credentials to access the network. In the sensor nodes direction, on the other 
hand, the coordinator(s) delegates only authenticated sensors that hold the correct authentication 
tokens at the time of the communication.  
 
 
Figure ‎6-1 Network Model External Structure 
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Figure 6.1 captures the main design aspects of the network external structure. Such 
network is ideal in a medical or industry setting where the proximity of the sensor nodes makes it 
almost impossible for physical capture of sensor nodes to occur. Moreover, given coordinators 
are administered by network administrators who assign users such as physicians, nurses, quality 
control workers, etc. access to the WSN, we can make sure that only authorized personnel can 
access the network.  
6.3 The Proposed MOHC Authentication Scheme 
In this section, we introduce the formal description of our mini OHC (MOHC) 
authentication scheme. There are three components of the proposed solution: the user’s mobile 
device, the coordinator CO, and the sensor nodes SN. The user’s mobile device can be 
configured by the network administrator and is equipped with network access capabilities in the 
form of a username and a password. The user is anyone who is allowed to have access to the data 
(e.g. in the case of WSN used in the medical field, it could be the physician, the patient or the 
nurse etc.). 
The network communication scenario consists of the following steps: 
1) The network administrator provides WSN users with temporary login credentials that are 
changed by the respective users after initial login. This step ensures that only authorized 
personnel are allowed to have access to the WSN. By changing the password, we make sure 
that administrators’ role is just to establish service.  
2) Once logged in, the user communicates with the coordinator by sending a query asking for 
data from the sensor nodes.  
3) The coordinator sends requests to the respective sensor nodes.  
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4) Once gathered, the sensor node(s) delivers the data to the coordinator who checks that each 
replying sensor has the correct credentials, accepting data if this condition holds, otherwise, 
data will be denied.    
5) The coordinator replies to the user with the requested data. 
6) Steps 2-5 are repeated for each query generated by the user in the current user session. 
With this communication scenario in mind, we designed the protocol to achieve user and 
broadcast authentication throughout the WSN session. Therefore, the protocol works in two 
directions: the user direction and the SNs direction. In the user direction, once successfully 
logged in to the network, login credentials will be substituted by a secret value (Secret), which 
will be generated by the coordinator. This Secret automatically expires once the user logs out. 
Each time the user logs in, there will be a new generated Secret. This secret will be used to 
generate authentication tokens used to secure subsequent communication. The first 
authentication token V1 will be the result of applying a hash function h(.) to the Secret||C,  where 
C is the current number of communications between CO and the user; initially C=0. Thus, the 
first authentication token will have the value V1:= H
K
(Secret|| C), where K, the length of the hash 
chain, is decremented after each iteration. Before each communication between the coordinator 
and the user, the C index is incremented. In the subsequent transactions, and to avoid exposing 
the Secret and potentially compromising the WSN, we replace the Secret in the hash function 
with the preceding authentication token used in the previous communication. Thus, the second 
authentication token V has the value V2:= H
K-1
(V1|| C+1), then V1 is disposed, and V2 is used 
instead to generate the third authentication token which is V3:= H
K-2
(V2|| C+2) and so on. The 
length of the chain K used in our implementation is 10. In [13], we proposed a scheme where 
one-way hash chains are divided into smaller hash chains. The best length of a chain striking a 
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good balance in terms of hash count falls between 10 and 25. Each time the chain length is 
exhausted, the index K is reset.    
In the sensor nodes direction, the protocol works a little differently. It actually works in 
phases: the first phase occurs during deployment when sensor nodes identify themselves to the 
coordinator. The coordinator subsequently distributes Seed0 among the sensor nodes which will 
be used in a hash function at the sensor node’s side. The value of Seed0 is never exposed, but 
used in a way similar to what we did with the Secret for the user authentication; i.e., as input for 
a hash function h(.) to generate subsequent authentication tokens. The second phase is when the 
actual communication begins when the coordinator relays a user’s query to SNs. In the first 
round of communication, we use Seed0 to generate the first authentication token at the sensor 
node’s side V1:= H
K
(Seed0|| Ci), where K is the hash chain length, decremented after each  round, 
and Ci is the number of communication rounds between sensor_node [i]  and the coordinator; 
initially Ci =0. The value of Ci is incremented before each round of communication. When Ci 
reaches a certain value, C_limit, we reset its value to 0 to avoid large numbers, and also update 
and broadcast Seed0 to sensor_node [i]. In the subsequent rounds, and to avoid exposing of Seed0 
and potentially compromising the WSN, we replace Seed0 in the hash function with the 
preceding authentication token. Thus, the second authentication token will be V2:= H
K-1
(V1|| Ci 
+1), then, V1 is discarded. The third authentication token will be V3:= H
K-2
(V2|| Ci +2), V2 is 
discarded, and so on. Once the hash chain length is exhausted, the index K is reset. Below a high 
level pseudo code of the authentication token scheme described in this section is presented.   
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Authentication token 
Phase 1: Deployment Phase 
Input: number of sensor nodes 
Coordinator creates Seed0 
Attach Seed0 to each Sensor node 
Set number of communications Ci between Sensor node [i] and coordinator to 0 
Phase 2: Operational Phase 
Input: sensor_node [i] or coordinator 
Increment Ci 
If Authentication token in sensor_node [i] or coordinator is the first authentication 
     K:= 10 
    Create 1
st
 token V:=  H
K
(Seed0 || Ci ) 
Else 
                Prev_V= V 
V:= H
K
(Prev_V || Ci ),  End if 
Decrement K 
If  K  is equal to 0 
    K:= 10; End_if 
If Ci is equal to C_limit 
    Set Ci to 0 
    If input is coordinator 
    Create random Seed0 
    Broadcast Seed0 to sensor_node [i] 
    End If 
End If 
Return (V) 
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The above description is for the protocol when utilized in lenient environments. We also 
developed the code with the potential of being deployed in harsh environments where more 
stringent authentication is desired. We achieve this functionality by determining and presetting 
an expiration to the Seed. The expiration could be as simple as a period of time, or after a certain 
number of rounds of communication between the coordinator and sensor node.  Once the Seed is 
updated, the communication count has to be reset to 0. 
6.4 Simulation and Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme, we designed a testbed 
where the network model described in section 6.2 is depicted.  The whole network structure has 
been translated in a Java code and run without the authentication protocol. The performance of 
the simulated WSN is measured and reported. To test how our scheme impacts the simulated 
WSN network, we also wrote a Java code implementing the authentication protocol described in 
section 6.3. As a benchmark, we also simulated the authentication scheme if a straightforward 
OHC was used. A comparison between these scenarios is made and will be presented in the next 
section.  
In our simulation, the design consisted of two configurations: serial and parallel 
communication. One possible example where the serial mode can be found is in 
industry/manufacturing quality control where a product stays on the assembly line for a period of 
time and moves from one point to another for different phases of processing. In each phase, there 
is a sensor to measure the product temperature and report it to the coordinator. For that purpose, 
a set of serial transactions is useful. In this configuration, the coordinator sends a request 
message to the first sensor node, and receives a response message from it. Then, the coordinator 
sends a request message to the second sensor node, and receives a response message from it, and 
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so on until all sensors reply with their data. The coordinator, then, sends the response message to 
the mobile device or the quality control manager. In the parallel mode, the coordinator sends a 
request message to all sensor nodes at the same time by creating multiple threads. After all 
response messages are received, it sends a response message to the mobile device. An example 
where parallel configuration is ideal is a medical setting where a physician, for instance, needs to 
monitor a patient’s electrocardiogram (EKG) by placing the sensor nodes around the body. Thus, 
multiple threads are initiated between the coordinator and sensor nodes.  
To measure the effectiveness of our proposed WSN authentication scheme, we used the 
following performance metrics in our simulations:  
 Time delay: the time was measured based on rounds of communication between the 
coordinator and N sensor nodes. Figure 6.2 shows one round of communication for N sensors 
in the serial mode. For example a round of communication between the coordinator and sensor 
node 1 is the difference between the time that coordinator sends a request message to sensor 
node (t1) and receives a response from the sensor node t2. We measured the WSN performance, 
in the serial and parallel modes, once without the proposed authentication scheme and another 
time when the authentication scheme is plugged either in the OHC or our MOHC format.   
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Figure ‎6-2 Example of time calculation for serial mode 
 Average number of hashes: the average number of hash operations performed during a round 
of communication. Given the fact that each component of the WSN (coordinator and sensor 
nodes) is going to calculate the same number of hashes in each round of communication, we 
used an average number of hashes for each of these components and presented comparisons 
based on them.  
6.5 Performance and Results 
In this section, we present the performance evaluation results of our protocol. Let us first 
look at how the MOHC protocol performed when compared with the case of no authentication at 
all, and with the straightforward OHC. Table 6.1 illustrates the difference in milliseconds 
between these three cases in the serial mode. Here, we compared the time in the case of no 
authentication, straight forward OHC and our protocol based on the number of rounds of 
communication between the coordinator and the sensor nodes. In this case, the coordinator sends 
a query to the first sensor node and waits for its response before sending the next request to the 
 101 
second sensor node. The results indicate that adding authentication increases the time. This 
increase tends to correlate linearly with the duration of the WSN session which is not 
unexpected. However, our focus was to compare our idea of mini hash chains on the 
performance of WSN with the straightforward implementation of OHC. When the number of 
rounds of communication is small, as in the case of 50 rounds, it can be seen that the difference 
between OHC and MOHC protocol is approximately 2 milliseconds. However, this difference 
becomes more salient with higher rounds of communication numbers. In real WSN traffic, 
communication is expected to be higher, and, therefore, rounds of communication number 
increases, which makes our solutions an obvious better choice as it outperforms its counterpart 
by a margin.  
Table ‎6-1 Time comparisons showing equal execution overheads for MOHC and OHC 
(Serial Mode) 
Rounds of 
communication 
No-
Authentication
* OHC
* 
MOHC
* 
50 1192 1201 1199 
150 2513 2531 2526 
300 5011 5047 5029 
600 9767 9874 9793 
   * In milliseconds  
Similarly, Table 6.2 summarizes the performance comparison in the parallel mode. As 
described above, the coordinator initiates multiple threads to send a request message to all sensor 
nodes.  The response messages are received in no particular order from the sensor nodes. Here, 
we can see the time required to run the simulation without authentication is much less. However, 
the time required for authentication, either in the serial or parallel mode, is approximately the 
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same. What is important for our comparison is the time difference between OHC and our 
MOHC. The difference in time shows our protocol still outperforms the OHC as the table shows.  
Table ‎6-2 Time comparisons showing equal execution overheads for MHOC and OHC 
(Parallel Mode) 
Rounds of 
communication 
No-
Authentication
* OHC
* 
MOHC
* 
50 297 306 304 
150 939 957 951 
300 1545 1581 1563 
600 3104 3211 3131 
   * In milliseconds  
 
Figure ‎6-3 Time comparisons between OHC and MOHC protocol with higher rounds of 
communication (Serial Mode). 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
100 500 1000 1500 3000
T
o
ta
l 
T
im
e
 (
M
S
) 
Number of rounds of communication 
MOHC
OHC
 103 
In order to further demonstrate the improvement we achieved in our protocol over OHC, 
we measured the time difference between the performance of the two schemes and present it in  
Figure 6.3. This figure represents the performance in the serial mode.  
As can be seen Figure 6.3, the higher the number of rounds of communication, the wider 
the difference margin is. This is another indication that using our MOHC protocol definitely 
improves performance and makes deploying a one-way hash chain based protocol more 
attractive in WSN.   
When the average number of hashes required for a round of communication is compared 
as in Figure 6.4, we still can see how our MOHC scheme outperforms the traditional OHC. 
Similar to the time delay compared above, as the number of rounds of communication increases, 
so does the average hash count. This is indicative of the high computation cost of the one-way 
hash chain schemes if configured as is. With minor modifications, like the ones we have 
proposed in this chapter, we were able to achieve noticeable improvements. It should be noted 
though that regardless of configuration options, the number of hashes is going to be the same. 
Each component of the WSN will calculate the same number of hashes.  
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Figure ‎6-4 Average number of hashes comparison between OHC and MOHC 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented a mini one-way hash chain based solution for WSN 
user and broadcast authentication. Our objective of the proposed solution was to mitigate the 
high computational cost of the straightforwardly configured one-way hash chain and avoid 
exposing the initial secret. We have shown through simulation and evaluative experiments that 
with economic modifications to one-way hash chains, we were able to achieve lower 
computational overhead measured by computation time and number of hash operations required 
to provide protection. Additionally, by substituting the initial secret with easily computed 
authentication tokens, we were able to maintain the initial secret less exposed. We have also 
shown that our protocol is attractive form an energy consumption perspective as it lowers 
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consumption of sensor nodes’ battery lives. In the future, we plan to improve our solution and 
apply it in alternative WSN topologies.  
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 HYBRID CACHE-SUPPORTED HACH CHAPTER 7:
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have proposed four schemes utilizing different configurations 
of one-way hash constructions to deliver efficient authentication schemes that are attractive to 
developers.  Our main goal has been to achieve efficiency while utilizing the minimum 
computing resources possible. In this chapter, we explore the possibility of utilizing the two-
dimensional HACH equipped with sparse caching capabilities to carry out authentication. While 
the scheme is designed with the collaborative and social media network in mind, it can be easily 
employed in other environments where session cookies based authentication is used. 
7.2  The proposed Hybrid Scheme  
We propose a hybrid solution that maximizes efficiency and minimizes the cost of 
memory resources. To achieve this, we divide the one-way hash chain into multiple chains and 
support them with caching units where authentication tokens are stored and fetched as needed. 
To measure efficiency, we use the number of hash operations needed in a session. In the next 
section, we define the configuration of the system’s components and determine the cost based on 
these configurations. Before this overview is presented, we introduce the notations used in the 
scheme. We refer to the proposed scheme as the hybrid scheme.  
Scheme Notation 
I = mini OHC scheme 
J = OHC Caching scheme 
K = Hybrid scheme 
 
 
 107 
Common Notation 
N = number of transactions 
X = horizontal chain for seeds   
Y = vertical chain for authentication tokens   
M = space interval between cache units 
N = X × Y       // simplified assumption   
We will introduce a more detailed description of these notations in our description of the 
schemes below.   
7.2.1 The mini OHC Scheme: 
The conventional OHC scheme has one dimension where one seed is used to generate 
authentication tokens by a single one-way hash chain for the whole session. However, the mini 
OHC scheme is arranged into two dimensions (see Figure 7.1). In the first dimension (i.e. the 
horizontal axis Xi), there is a single hash chain that computes the seeds for the second dimensions 
chains (i.e. vertical axis Yi). In the second dimension, we have multiple hash chains that use these 
seeds to generate authentication tokens. Authentication tokens are generated by hashing the 
seeds using cryptographic hash functions (e.g. SHA-1, SHA-2 or SHA-3). These cryptographic 
hash functions are known for their resistance against attacks. 
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Figure ‎7-1 mini OHC Scheme 
Authentication in the mini OHC is done in three steps: 
 Initialization:  
The server and the client utilize an HTTPS channel to exchange the number of 
transactions in a session N, an initial value of the shared secret S0, and the length of the 
authentication token chain Yi. Based on these variables, the number of seeds is determined, and 
Seed1 is calculated to be used in the first authentication token chain by applying one-way hash 
function on S0.  
 Authentication: 
 In this step, the scheme generates the authentication token V at the client side. The 
authentication tokens are derived in the vertical chains by applying the one-way hash function on 
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Seed1. The authentication token is then attached to the transaction cookie and sent to the server. 
A similar authentication routine is done at the server’s side to check the authenticity of the 
authentication token. If authentication is verified, the transaction is accepted; otherwise, it will be 
rejected. Once the first vertical chain is exhausted, the next routine (i.e. Seed Update) is called to 
calculate seeds for the following vertical chain.  
 Seed Update:  
Once the first vertical chain is exhausted, the seed is updated for the next chain by 
applying a one-way hash function on the initial S0. Note that each seed is only used in a single 
vertical chain to generate authentication tokens for that chain. Furthermore, the authentication 
tokens once used are discarded and never used again. As such, the cost of authentication in the 
mini OHC scheme is a result of calculating the number of hash operations in the horizontal chain 
and the multiple vertical chains. The following is how we calculate the cost of the scheme:  
Cost of one vertical chain = 
𝑌𝑖× ( 𝑌𝑖+1)
2
       ( ‎7.1 ) 
Total cost of all vertical chains = CV = 𝑋𝑖 ×
𝑌𝑖× ( 𝑌𝑖+1)
2
  
                                                         = 𝑁 ×
 ( 𝑌𝑖+1)
2
      ( ‎7.2 )  
Cost of the horizontal chain= CH =
𝑋𝑖× ( 𝑋𝑖+1)
2
      ( ‎7.3 ) 
Total Cost = C = CV + CH 
                  =  𝑁 ×
 ( 𝑌𝑖+1)
2
 + 
𝑋𝑖× ( 𝑋𝑖+1)
2
       ( ‎7.4 ) 
7.2.2 The OHC Caching Scheme:  
Unlike the previous mini OHC scheme, the OHC caching scheme utilizes storage and 
only one-dimension chain, to reduce the computation overhead of the OHC. During the 
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initialization step, and in addition to the initial S0 a few authentication tokens are pre-calculated 
and stored. Figure 7.2 demonstrates how the cache units are placed for this scheme. The 
highlighted blocks are where the authentication tokens are stored. For ease we assume the 
interval between caches is one. It should be noted that since we only have one dimension in the 
OHC caching scheme, the X parameter is considered the cache size (i.e. number of cache units 
utilized). Also, given we do not have vertical chains, we consider Y to be the interval between 
cache units. Therefore, Xj= size of cache Yj= interval between two cache units. 
 
Figure ‎7-2 OHC Caching Scheme 
To reiterate, let us revisit an example for a session of 100 transactions authenticated using 
the OHC caching scheme. For a session of this size, five storage units (of length 160 bits for 
SHA-1) can be reserved. Thus five authentication tokens are calculated in the initial steps and 
stored at 20 transaction interval as follows. Note that Xj in this example is 5 and Yj is 20.   
cache[0] = s            
cache[1] = H
20
(s),  
cache[2] = H
40
(s),  
cache[3] = H
60
(s),  
cache[4] = H
80
(s). 
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Compared to the mini OHC scheme, the OHC with caching has the advantage of low 
computation cost. Two important parameters are used to guide the calculation of computation 
overhead in the OHC with caching: the cache size Xj and the cache spacing interval Yj. In the 
above example, the cache size= 5 and the cache spacing interval= 20. Based on these 
assumptions, we can determine the cost of the OHC caching scheme according to the following 
formulas:  
Cost of authentication tokens between two cache units = 
𝑌𝐽× ( 𝑌𝐽+1)
2
   ( ‎7.5 ) 
Total Cost = C = 𝑋𝑗 ×
𝑌𝐽× ( 𝑌𝐽+1)
2
  
                = 𝑁 ×
 ( 𝑌𝐽+1)
2
        ( ‎7.6 ) 
It should be noted that the total cost includes the sum of the cost of (Xj-1) ×Yj for the 
initial filling of the cache values and a cost of 
(𝑋𝑗−1) × Y× (𝑋𝑗+1)
2
 for the N transactions. Also, 
notice that (Xj-1) of the N transactions will not need to perform any hashing since the required 
value is already in the cache. For the above example of N = 100 and Xj = 5, transaction # 21 will 
simply read V80 from cache[4]. 
In order to handle more transactions efficiently, we either need to increase the number of 
storage units allocations. Or, we have to increase the cache spacing interval.  
7.3 HACH Hybrid Scheme  
We can alleviate the need for extra storage units and increase efficiency by equipping the 
mini OHC with sparse caching components to benefit from the advantages of caching in a two-
dimensional configuration. Figure 7.3 is a general view of how the hybrid scheme looks with the 
caching units added to the mini OHC in the vertical chain Yk. In the Simulation Results Section, 
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we discuss why we prefer to equip the scheme with caching at the vertical chain. The highlighted 
blocks are where the sparse caching units are placed, and the authentication tokens in these 
locations are computed and stored. The proposed scheme uses two dimensions, each of which 
generates a set of values. In the first dimension—the horizontal dimension denoted Xk, is a single 
one-way hash chain responsible for generating seeds to be used in producing the authentication 
tokens in the second dimension Yk—the vertical multiple one-way hash chains. 
 
Figure ‎7-3 HACH Hybrid Scheme 
Here is a high level description of the protocol.  
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Initialization: 
Xk := N ÷Yk                                 // length of the Seed_Chain 
K:= Yk                                        // K is the global index for the Token_Chain 
J:= Xk                                        // J is the global index for the Seed_Chain  
Seed:= H
J
(S0)                         // Seed is now Seed1 for the first Token_Chain 
Interval:= Yk÷ Cache_Size    // # of hash operations between cache units 
Call Fill_Cache(Seed) 
Fill_Cache (Seed) 
Begin 
i:= 0 
HNum:= 1                                               // number of hashes to be calculated  
While( i not equal to Cache_Size) 
Cache[i]:= H
M
(Seed)                          // authentication tokens stored 
HNum:= HNum +Interval 
 i:= i+1 
 End-While 
End 
Authentication ( ) 
Begin 
L:= (K/Interval)-1                          //L is the cache locator to fetch the token  value  
HNum:= K-(L*interval)-1 
V:= H
HNum
(Cache[L])          
K:= K -1 
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if (K==0) then 
   Update_Seed( ) 
  K:= Yk;  
  end_if 
Return (V); 
End 
Update_Seed( ) 
Begin 
J := J-1                            // J is the global index for the first-tier chain 
Seed:= H
J
(S0); 
Call Fill_Cache(Seed)  // update the next authentication tokens  
Return (Seed) 
End 
The protocol is composed of four main procedures: the Initialization, the Authentication, 
the Update_Seed and the Fill_Cache (Seed) routines. Each of these routines is responsible for 
some part of the protocol.  
The Initialization procedure works the same way as described in the mini OHC described 
in Section 3. An additional step in the Initialization entails filling the cache with authentication 
tokens based on the cache size. This is achieved by invoking the Fill_Cache (Seed) procedure.  
The next step is when the session actually starts. It is where authentication tokens are 
used to protect session cookies. The Authentication procedure is responsible for generating the 
authentication tokens. This step works by locating the closest cache, fetching the respective 
stored authentication token and performing the additional hash operations if needed. Once the 
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first vertical chain is exhausted, the Update_Seed step is invoked and a new seed is calculated 
and handed over to Fill_Cache (Seed) so that authentication tokens for the next Token Chain are 
stored. The protocol works in this manner until the session is complete.  
Compared to the single dimension OHC caching scheme described in Section 3, where 
the number of cache units devised either grows proportionately with the number of transactions, 
or is configured to handle more transactions by increasing the cache spacing interval, the hybrid 
scheme is more efficient. In other words, to achieve good performance with higher number of 
transactions, the OHC caching scheme will need to devise more cache units. In the hybrid 
configuration, however, we efficiently handle this scenario, but with much less space by 
emptying storage after each Token Chain is exhausted.  
While the mini OHC performance is influenced by the length of the Token Chain and the 
OHC with caching by the cache size, we need to investigate the optimal configuration of the 
hybrid scheme by comparing the costs of the previous two schemes and identifying the factors 
that influence the performance. In the following section, we introduce our evaluation of these 
factors and present an analytical model to find the best tradeoff between cache employment and 
performance.  
7.4 Comparison and Tradeoffs 
Essentially, using the number of hash operations in a session as a measurement metric, 
the mini OHC has higher computation cost as opposed to the OHC caching scheme. The 
difference between the two schemes is 
𝑋𝑖 × ( 𝑋𝑖 +1)
2
. However, there is the expense of extra storage 
units associated with OHC caching scheme. If the number of cache units devised is relatively 
small, the performance is comparable. However, if more cache units are added, the OHC caching 
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scheme outperforms the mini OHC. Figure 7.4 shows how the two schemes give different 
performance for different size of cache for 500 transactions.  
 
Figure ‎7-4 Total Cost of 500 transactions with different x values 
In the hybrid scheme, our goal is to utilize the minimum storage requirements while 
efficiently handling authentication. First, we present how the total hash cost of the hybrid scheme 
is calculated. The analytical model below is used to obtain the optimal setup of the scheme; we 
try to achieve a configuration that strikes a balance between efficiency and memory 
requirements.  
𝑁 =  𝑋𝐾 ×  𝑌𝐾          ( ‎7.7 ) 
Assuming 𝑋𝐾 << 𝑌𝐾  and using the same number of sparse storage units X in the vertical 
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0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
100 50 25 5
T
o
ta
l 
C
o
st
 
X 
OHC Caching
Mini OHC
 117 
Let Space_Interval 𝑀 =  
 𝑌𝐾
𝑋𝐾
   for simplifying assumption M integer 
𝑌𝐾 =  𝑀 ×  𝑋𝐾              ( ‎7.8 ) 
 𝑁 = 𝑋𝐾 × 𝑌𝐾 = 𝑀 × 𝑋
2        ( ‎7.9 ) 
Cost of authentication tokens between 2 cache units = 
𝑀× ( 𝑀+1)
2
   ( ‎7.10 ) 
Cost of one vertical chain = 𝑋𝐾 ×  
𝑀× ( 𝑀+1)
2
 = 𝑌𝐾 ×
 ( 𝑀+1)
2
    ( ‎7.11 ) 
Cost of all vertical chains = CV = 𝑋𝐾 ×  𝑌𝐾 ×
 ( 𝑀+1)
2
 = 𝑁 ×
 ( 𝑀+1)
2
   ( ‎7.12 ) 
Cost of horizontal chain = CH = 
𝑋𝐾 × ( 𝑋𝐾 +1)
2
       ( ‎7.13 ) 
Total Cost = C = CV + CH = 𝑁 ×
 ( 𝑀+1)
2
+  
𝑋𝐾 × ( 𝑋𝐾 +1)
2
     ( ‎7.14 ) 
The above formula can be used to plot C as a function of N and M where X = √
𝑁
𝑀
 
C= 0.5𝑁𝑀 + 0.5𝑁 + 0.5 
𝑁
𝑀 
+ 0.5 √
𝑁
𝑀 
      ( ‎7.15 ) 
To find the optimal value of M which minimizes the cost C, we differentiate the above 
formula with respect to M and equate to 0. On differentiation we have  
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑀
 = 0.5 𝑁 − 0.5 
𝑁
𝑀2 
+ 0.5 √𝑁 ( −0.5 𝑀
−3
2 ⁄ ) 
     =  0.5𝑁 − 0.5 
𝑁
𝑀2 
− 0.25 
1
𝑀 
√
𝑁
𝑀 
       ( ‎7.16 ) 
After equating 
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑀
 to zero, we get the following quartic equation: 
4𝑁𝑀4 − 8𝑁𝑀2 − 𝑀 + 4𝑁 = 0       ( ‎7.17 ) 
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To give an example, the Plot of the function C when the number of transactions is 500 is 
given below in Figure 7.5. 
 
Figure ‎7-5 The minimum value of M when N= 500 
Thus, the minimum value occurs near the value M = 1. Table 7-1 summarizes the optimal 
values of M for the different numbers of transactions.  
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Table ‎7-1 Optimal values of M 
 
N 
Optimal value of M by 
equating 
𝒅𝑪
𝒅𝑴
= 𝟎 
500 1.01118 
1000 1.00791 
1500 1.00645 
2000 1.00559 
2500 1.00500 
3000 1.00456 
 
Based on the analytical modeling presented above, we can determine the optimal cache 
spacing in the hybrid scheme to be 1. Therefore, given the optimal Token Chain length Yk 
obtained in [14], we run our simulation with the assumption that the optimal cache spacing is 1. 
In the next section the simulation results for the three schemes are presented.   
7.5 Simulation and Performance Results 
The performance of the HACH hybrid scheme is evaluated using a detailed Java 
benchmark. Our goal was to measure the performance of the three schemes. We compared and 
contrasted the results measured in terms of efficiency (number of hash operations in a session) 
and in terms of storage units required to complete an internet session.  
7.5.1 Caching options 
The hybrid scheme can benefit from caching in a number of ways. Our first option is to 
use caching in the Token Chain Yk. In other words, we only store the authentication tokens or a 
subset of them in the vertical dimension of the mini OHC. Caching can be either full or partial. 
 120 
In the full caching option, all the authentication tokens are calculated and stored before 
authentication, whereas only a subset of authentication tokens are calculated and stored in the 
partial caching option. Below is a description of both options.   
In the full caching  
The number of cache units required is equal to the optimal Token Chain length Yk. Since 
all authentication tokens are going to be calculated and stored before the start of the session, the 
full caching approach indicates that the authentication tokens do not require any hash operation 
in the Yk. The only cost incurred when full caching is utilized would be hash operations used to 
derive the seeds in the Xk.  
In the partial caching  
A subset of authentication tokens in the Token Chain Yk is stored. We use the optimal 
cache spacing obtained above (i.e. M = 1) and the optimal Token Chain Yk as the basis for our 
spacing. As a result, each authentication token will cost either one hash operation or none (i.e. 
fetching the authentication token form the cache). Here is an example to illustrate this:   
Suppose we have an Internet session of length 500 transactions. According to [15], the 
optimal length of Yk in the mini OHC is 10. The length of Seed Chain Xk is going to be 50.  
Cache [0]=H
1
(S1) 
Cache [1]=H
3
(S1) 
Cache [2]=H
5
(S1) 
Cache [3]=H
7
(S1) 
Cache [4]=H
9
(S1) 
Given the number of cache units and the spacing interval, the following are the first ten 
authentication tokens along with their cost in terms of hash operations.  
 121 
1
st
 Transaction = V1 = H
1
(Cache [4])  
2
nd
 Transaction = V2 = H
0
(Cache [4]) 
3
rd
 Transaction = V3 = H
1
(Cache [3]) 
……. 
 10
th
 Transaction = V10 = H
0
(cache [0]) 
Therefore, for every Yk only 5 hash operations are required given we have 5 cache units 
uniformly distributed. The maximum number of hash operations for the authentication token 
transaction is 1 if partial caching with cache spacing of 1 is used.  
These caches are used in the first Yk. Once this chain is exhausted, the cache is emptied 
and a new seed is generated for the next Yk authentication tokens. New values are calculated and 
the cache is filled again with new authentication tokens. If partial caching was used in the OHC 
with caching scheme only, we would need 250 memory spaces to carry out an Internet session of 
length 500 transactions to achieve comparable results. With adding partial sparse caching to the 
mini OHC, we can bring this number down to just 5 memory spaces.  
7.5.2 Full vs. Partial Caching Performance 
Figure 7.6 demonstrates the session cost measured by the number of hashes in the full 
caching configuration and the partial caching operation. We perform this test when caching is 
only performed at the Token Chain Yk. Later, we test the caching option in the Seed Chain Xk. 
Here we can see that the full caching does not have a tremendous improvement over partial 
caching.  
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Figure ‎7-6 Session cost comparison between full and partial caching in g in Y 
Thus, the next step is to compare the storage requirements in the full and partial caching 
configurations in the Token Chain Yk to see whether it is worth to employ full caching or partial 
caching. The comparison is presented in Figure 7.7. While the partial caching requires half the 
storage of the full caching, it can still achieve good results. Therefore, the partial caching can be 
a better option as the memory requirement is half without sacrificing performance.  
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Figure ‎7-7 Storage requirement comparison between full and partial caching 
7.5.3 Performance Comparison between the three schemes 
Since the partial caching option strikes a good balance between memory requirement and 
efficient performance, we compare the performance of the hybrid scheme in the partial caching 
option at the Token Chain Yk with the HACH caching scheme and the mini HACH scheme. 
Table 7.2 summarizes the results of this comparison. Note that we use the same number of cache 
units in the simulation of each scenario except for mini HACH where caching is not supported. 
In terms of efficiency, the mini HACH scheme helps reduce the session cost significantly if 
compared to the HACH scheme. By utilizing very little storage in the hybrid scheme, we were 
able to lower this cost by approximately 65% as indicated in the table.   
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Table ‎7-2 Comparing session cost between the three schemes 
Number of 
Transactions 
HACH 
mini 
HACH 
Hybrid 
HACH 
500 25250 4025 1525 
1000 71930 10009 3465 
1500 141382 12505 5750 
2000 251000 24875 8875 
2500 348471 33496 10980 
 
7.6 Caching in Token Chain Yk or Seed Chain Xk 
Our next task is to see whether equipping the proposed scheme with caching capabilities 
in both dimensions can have better outcome. Figure 7.8 and 7.9 demonstrate the storage and 
session cost requirements if either the Seed Chain or the Token Chain is equipped with caching 
capabilities. It is obvious that adding caching in the Seed Chain does not benefit the scheme as 
storage requirement increases (Figure 7.8) while the session cost increases (Figure 8.9). 
Therefore, we have opted for equipping the hybrid scheme with sparse caching at the Token 
Chain to be the optimal setup.  
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Figure ‎7-8 Storage requirement comparison with cache support in either Token_Chain 
(Y) or Seed_Chain (X) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
S
to
ra
g
e
 R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
Number of Transactions 
Partial Caching in Y
Partial Caching in X
 126 
 
Figure ‎7-9 Session cost comparison with cache support in either Token_Chain (Y) or 
Seed_Chain (X) 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the security threat of session hijacking attacks facing collaborative 
applications especially when mobile and wireless applications are utilized to access collaborative 
services. Common HTTPS based solutions do not usually suit mobile devices especially those 
with limited computation and storage capacities. One-way hash chain based solutions have been 
proposed to replace the current cookie based session management techniques but due to their 
inherent nature requiring recursive computation of hash values, they do not suit some mobile 
devices. This is particularly because of the high computational overhead associated with OHC in 
Internet session.  
This chapter proposed and analyzed the potential of a hybrid solution where divided one-
way hash chains are equipped with caching capacities to store pre-computed hashed values and 
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fetch them once needed to authenticate a user session. We presented an analytical model which 
aimed at measuring the cost of the hybrid scheme compared to the straightforward HACH with 
caching and the two-dimensional HACH. We also used this analysis to derive a quartic equation 
with which we were able to identify the optimal cache spacing configuration in the hybrid 
scheme. The evaluation and experimentation reveal major improvements and highlight 
advantage of adding sparse caching to the mini one-way hash chains to achieve economic and 
efficient authentication for mobile devices that suits collaborative applications and other Internet 
applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128 
 IMPROVED AUTHENTICATION IN SINGLE SIGN-ON CHAPTER 8:
ENVIRONMENT AND RFID IN TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS  
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we propose an authentication scheme tailored for the growing SSO 
environment. Our scheme relies on the utilization of hash calendars and Merkle Hash trees in 
addition to HACH to provide for a keyless signature environment. Our main motivation for 
adopting a keyless signature scheme is that the majority of SSO schemes that suffer from 
impersonation attacks rely heavily on public/private key cryptosystems to achieve their 
authentication. Our goal is to add rigor and robustness to current SSO systems without 
sacrificing functionality and effectiveness. 
8.2 Problem Statement  
Before we provide a formal definition of the authentication problem in SSO, let us 
introduce the typical components of SSO systems and their functionalities. Figure 8.1 depicts the 
SSO overall architecture. As can be seen in the figure, the communication and authentication of 
the SSO follows the steps illustrated. In the first step, a client requests a URI (unified resource 
identifier) from a service provider. Second, the service provider contacts an identity provider, 
who manages and delegates authentication in the scheme, to check if the client holds the required 
authentication privileges (an active user session established via the exchange of user’s 
credentials), and, if not, asks the user to create one and provide it to the identity provider. If the 
user provides the necessary authentication credentials, the identify provider provides the 
requesting services provider and the other participating service providers with authentication 
assertion that entail that the user is a verified one.   
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Figure ‎8-1 SSO overall structure 
The authors of [95] indicate that the main cause of SSO impersonation attacks are related 
to the design of the communication channel between the service providers and the identity 
provider which lacks bi-directional authentication. In fact, the SAML 2.0 specification 
repeatedly indicate that the communication between the client, who is typically a browser guided 
by a user, and the SP is carried over a unilateral SSL connection. Similarly, the communication 
between the client and the SP starts as a unilateral SSL connection and becomes bilateral once 
the client is authenticated through the exchange of valid certificates from the IdP and appropriate 
credentials from the clients. These two assumptions are, according to [51], problematic due to 
two essential reasons: 1) the lack/ambiguity of authentication recentness which is a logical 
requirement in any authentication scheme, and 2) the unidirectional nature of authentication 
between the SP and the client. As far the first reason is concerned, the SAML 2.0 specification 
states that the SP and client mutually authenticate and agree on the value of URI, but fails to 
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guarantee whether this assertion is recent or not. This feature is particularly important given the 
fact that the SAML 2.0 protocol does not guarantee authentication to be carried out using a 
single SSL connection. Due to difficulties pertaining to the nature of SSL such as the difficulty 
to resume an already established connection after it has been terminated, it is natural to assume 
that SAML 2.0 protocol is carried out using different SSL connections. Therefore, the recentness 
of authentication assertion is not possible to achieve unless the protocol is run with each run of 
the SSL connection, which is necessarily against the whole nature of SSO. In terms of the second 
reason, the SAML 2.0 does not provide the client with guarantees of the authenticity of the SP’s 
after he/she has been granted access by the IdP. Similar problems have also been detected in the 
OpenID environment. 
 The lack of recentness of the SSL protocols utilized in the SSO environment and the uni-
directional nature of the SSO schemes makes it possible for a malicious SP to impersonate a 
client and cause it to access certain resources without its consent. Therefore, it is imperative for 
any authentication scheme to be suitable for SSO to satisfy these requirements in addition to the 
common authentication requirements.      
8.3 The Proposed SSO Authentication Scheme 
Our main goal in this paper is to develop a solution that efficiently handles the security of 
SSO. In the proposed protocol, we pay special attention to the possible causes of certain SSO 
vulnerabilities. From a cryptographic point of view, access to the SSO requires the service 
providers, clients as well as identity providers to carry their communication based on public and 
private keys as seen in the majority of the schemes discussed in the Literature Review Chapter of 
this dissertation. The security of the whole environment is contingent upon these keys. If for any 
reason these keys are compromised, there is the risk of stolen identities, password revocation and 
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their likes. In this chapter, we propose a keyless signature scheme that is based on utilizing a 
hash calendar and Merkle Hash Trees in addition to our HACH protocol. In Table 8.1, we 
introduce the notations used in the chapter.  
Table ‎8-1 Keyless SSO Scheme Notations  
Symbol Description 
Idp The central Identity Provider 
C An SSO client 
SPs List of Service Providers 
K Length of one-way hash chain to generate authentication tokens 
Seed Secret value dispensed by SP to C to be used in V 
N The activity between client's login and logout 
V Authentication Token 
H() One way hash function 
CO The total computational cost during N 
I 
Computational cost in SSL connection when Seed is exchanged 
between C and SP 
8.3.1 Adversary Model 
We summarize the adversary model envisioned in the current scheme in the following 
steps. Steps of the attack involving a malicious service provider, which can be conducted by 
malicious code insertion:  
1. C contacts a malicious SP (thinking it’s an honest SP) requesting a URI  
2. Impersonating C, the malicious SP relays the request received from C to an honest SP  
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3. The honest SP replies to the malicious SP to authenticate himself to IdP. 
4. The malicious SP relays the authenticate message to C. 
5. C communicates with IdP through HTTPS for authentication and provide its credentials. 
6. IdP provides C with authentication assertions to be sent to SP. 
7. SP receives C’s authentication assertions and set cookies for further communication.  
8. When C tries to access a service at SP and provides session cookies, the malicious SP 
will steal the cookies because the connection is in http. 
9. Malicious SP will freely use services at SP as long as cookies are active.   
Let us before describing the details of our keyless protocol touch on the concepts of 
Merkle hash trees and hash calendars. 
8.3.2 Merkle Hash Trees  
A Merkle hash tree is a binary tree whose leaf nodes are pieces of data. Neighboring 
nodes are concatenated and hashed. The resulting hash value is the first level of the tree. An 
example of a Merkle Hash Tree is shown in Figure 8.2. At lowest level of the tree, we have the 
data that is hashed and placed in a leaf node.  
Let us now explain how authentication is conducted in a Merkle Hash Tree. At the lowest 
level of the tree, the values of the eight leaf nodes are calculated by applying a hash function h(i) 
=h(Ti)(i = 1, . . . , 8), where T is a piece of data. At the tree nodes level, the internal nodes are 
derived from their child nodes. For example, the value of the node h3,4 = h(h3||h4) and so on until 
we reach the root node h1,8=h(h1,4||h5,8). To verify the authenticity of a node, the leaf nodes can 
be authenticated with the root node h1,8 and the corresponding authentication path information. 
For example, to verify the node T1, the server, in which h1,8 (the root) is stored, checks the 
information sent from T1 (which also includes the corresponding authentication path information 
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= h2, h3,4, h5,8). The server first computes and h1, then h1,2 = h(h1||h2), h1,4 = h(h1,2||h3,4), and last, 
h1,8 = h(h1,4||h5,8). In the last step, the server checks whether the computed h1,8 corresponds to the 
existing h1,8. The server only accepts the data from T1, only if the two values are matching. 
Our utilization of the Merkle hash tree does not only involve authentication of data as 
explained above. Rather, we use it to generate a value that constitutes the SSO key. As will be 
shown later in this section, the Merkle hash tree construction enables us to periodically update 
this key.   
 
Figure ‎8-2 Merkle hash tree 
8.3.3 Hash Calendars  
The authors of [62] indicate that a hash calendar as a special type of a hash tree with leaf 
nodes representing every second since 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC. As such, at any given 
moment, the tree has a leaf node for each second starting from this time. The structure of the tree 
starts from left to right and each leaf node added is added to the right. They describe several 
ways the tree can be structured and hash chains for individual seconds are extracted from it. One 
such construction is as follows: 
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The tree is built with maximal number of nodes and the nodes representing future 
seconds are left empty as in Figure 8.3. In this particular figure, we have a tree for 11 seconds. 
Instead of the regular concatenation and hashing in a typical Merkle tree the, the empty nodes 
(grey nodes) are merged and copied to the next level. In case there is one empty node and 
another non-empty node, the non-empty node is copied to the next level (dashed lines). 
Therefore, in the chain extraction process, the copying processes are not included and only the 
copied nodes are used for the chain extraction.   
 
Figure ‎8-3 Hash calendar structure 
The authentication mechanism using the hash calendar is to a great extent similar to that 
of the Merkle Hash Trees. That is the authentication is achieved by using two pieces of 
information: 1) the authentication path information and the root hash. The hash calendar is 
originally proposed to perform timestamping functionality [62] that is verifiable if needed. The 
root hash of the hash calendar is calculated at a certain point and published via easily accessible 
media. In our proposed scheme, we employ the hash calendar not only to provide timestamping, 
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but also to produce the authentication key. The published root is used as a key to verify the 
authenticity of the communicating parties. More importantly, the root is updated periodically to 
ensure recentness of the authentication key. In our proposed scheme, we employ the hash 
calendar in a two-phase manner to produce the authentication key. The published root is used as 
a key to verify the authenticity of the communicating parties. More importantly, the root is 
updated periodically to ensure recentness of the authentication key. 
8.3.4 SSO Keyless Signature Scheme Components 
In this section, we introduce the main components of the proposed scheme and their 
roles.  
 Identity provider: the identity provider handles authentication and provides 
authentication assertions to the service providers and clients. The identity provider 
keeps track of a hash calendar which is pre-calculated and updated periodically (in the 
following step we will show when the hash calendar is updated), in addition to 
registering each log in by the client in a hash tree.    
 The client: the first communication between the client and the identity provider 
involves the creation and exchange of authentication credentials (a user name, and a 
password). This step can be SSL/TSL secured. The first log in and each subsequent log 
in are used as input for the hash tree. Once the root of the hash tree is calculated, the 
root of the two trees are concatenated and hashed to produce the new key for the 
scheme.  
 The service provider: like the client, the service provider contacts the identity provider 
to verify and get authentication assertions with reference to a certain client. Traffic 
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between the SP and C is secured by using a one-way hash chain which is meant to 
produce a bidirectional authentication channel.  
The identity provider is responsible for updating the hash trees and the hash calendar. 
Each time the hash calendar is updated, the root value is handed over to the service providers and 
the client as the fresh key for authentication. The key acts as a benchmark to validate the 
communication between nodes. So, instead of sharing a public key between clients and servers 
and utilizing private keys, the privacy of which is critical to the network, the key is used for 
verification of authenticity of the communicating nodes. As such, if a malicious service provider 
or client tries to get a hold of a client’s credentials, they would need to have an updated and fresh 
version of the key. 
8.3.5 SSO Authentication Procedure 
In this section, we provide a formal description of our SSO authentication procedure. The 
following is a pseudo code:  
C sends register request to Idp 
 
HashCalendar[C] ← Idp initializes a hash calendar for C (*) 
Idp publish hash root to C and SPs    (**) 
C sends a request to an URI at SP[i] 
Idp verifies that C has permission to access URI by receiving a request from SP[i]. 
LogIn (C, SP[i]) ← Idp authenticate if C is allowed to access URI at SP[i] 
Add LogIn(C, SP[i]) to a hash tree    (*) 
If the hash tree of C is complete 
 Calculate new hash root    (*) 
 Append hash root to HashCalendar[C]  (*) 
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 Idp publish hash root to C and SPs  (**) 
SP[i] verifies C is valid and not malicious 
If the hash root matches  
 Session[C] ← Active session for C 
 SP[i] Generate Seed and send it along with K to C 
Transaction Authentication[C] ←Verify C’s transaction  
 V← Hk(Seed)      (*) 
 Decrement K     (*) 
 If K is equal to 0  
 Update Seed      (*) 
 Reseat K 
 
(*) Computation Overhead is measured  
(**) Communication Overhead is measured 
As the code above shows, the SSO authentication scheme is composed of two main 
routines; one is done at eh IdP side and the other is conducted at the SP side. While the goal of 
the routine at the IdP is to generate the SSO key (i.e. the hash value of the hash calendar and the 
hash tree) which satisfies the recent key requirement explained in section 2, the SP routine 
satisfies the unidirectional authentication requirement by utilizing and adapting our HACH 
scheme. In the following, we provide more explanation:    
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Routine at the Idp:  
1. A client wants to access a service (URI) at an SP 
2. SP checks with IdP to see if C is a registered client. If yes go to step 3 and, if not do the 
following: 
  a. IdP returns to C for creating an account.  
b. Once the account is created, the IdP generates the hash root using a hash 
calendar and publishes to the client and SPs. 
c. IdP initializes a hash tree and registers the first log in in the tree.  
3. IdP checks if C is logged in: 
 a. If yes, go to step 1 in the second routine (routine at SP). 
 b. Otherwise, Idp requests C login information and add login info to the hash tree. 
4. Once the hash tree is complete a new hash root is calculated and used as a new hash 
root. 
Routine at the SP:  
Each SP handles authentication independently by running the following routine (this 
routine prevents impersonation attacks):  
1. After C tries to access a URI at SP, SP checks with IdP, which runs the first routine for 
authentication.  
2. If there is an active log in, the SP requests the hash root from C. If it matches hash root 
at SP, a new session starts. 
a. SP generates and sends a Seed to be used in Transaction Authentication routine, 
along with the chain length K to C. 
 139 
b. Each communication between C and SP is secured by authentication tokens 
generated by Transaction Authentication routine. If token V that came from C 
matches the stored one at SP, the transaction is accepted. 
 c. If session is exhausted the Seed is updated for the next authentication tokens.  
4. Continue session until C logs out, or session terminates for lack of authentication.  
Session termination causes:  
Session termination requires the client to log in again: These can be changed depending 
on application needs:  
1. Lack of authentication during an active session: when the client or SP fails to provide a 
current authentication token, the session terminates automatically and the user is required 
to log in again.  
2. Time constraints: the user has been idle for a specific amount of time during an active 
session.  
3. Changing machine: when the user logs in to the SSO using a different machine, the 
session in the first machine automatically terminates.  
4. Changing connections: using a wireless connection that converts to an LTE connection 
requires the user to log in again.  
8.4 Performance evaluation 
This section introduces the performance evaluation and testing. We first introduce the 
testbed that was used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme.  
8.4.1 Performance evaluation testbed 
In order to evaluate the proposed SSO authentication scheme, a simulation based testbed 
was designed and developed. The simulator simulates communication between the components 
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described in section 4.4. The simulator functions as follows: 1) the simulator generates a number 
of requests for each client, and simulates the operation of the identity provider to record the 
communication overhead, computation overhead and number of hash operations in order to 
estimate the efficiency and performance of the simulated SSO authentication scheme. We 
provide more description of these metrics below.  
8.4.2 Evaluation Metrics 
The simulation is measured by counting each of measurement factors based on the logic 
of the authentication scheme. As such, the simulation records these following metrics which we 
use as our main evaluation metrics of the scheme: 
• Communication Overhead is the number of communications required for the 
authentication scheme for services at service providers made by the client. The 
communication overhead entails communication between the client and the IdP in 
addition to communication between the client and SP’s. Each of these overheads is 
measured separately.  
• Computation Overhead is the number of computations required by the authentication 
scheme. Computation involves the creation and updating of the key from the IdP, in 
addition to the creation and update of the Seed at the SP’s. This involves the hashing 
operations required to generate and update these variables.  
The performance evaluation was run to find out the performance of the authentication 
scheme over a number of variables. The first configuration was when we varied the number of 
times a client logs in to the SSO. Second, we measured performance over variable number of 
service providers with fixed number of log ins. We then measure the optimal length of the one-
way hash chain responsible for authenticating traffic between the client and SP’s.  
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8.4.3 The Effect of Number of Log ins 
The first test run to evaluate the SSO authentication scheme was when the number of log 
ins was varied. This number was set at 10 service providers. The graph in Figure 8.4 shows the 
existence of a linear relation between the authentication scheme performance over increasing 
number of log ins in terms of communication overhead. This is not surprising, as it is intuitive to 
have an increase in communication, computation overheads as well as the number of hash 
operations. 
 
 
Figure ‎8-4 Communication Overhead over Variable Number of Log ins 
The number of log ins also has a an effect on the computational overhead of the scheme. 
In Figure 8.5, this overhead shows that the more log ins we have, the higher the computational 
overhead incurred. 
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Figure ‎8-5 Computational Overhead with Variable Number of Log ins 
8.4.4 Variable Number of Service Providers 
The second evaluation environment was when the number of service providers increased. 
We increased the number of service providers incrementally by 10 until we simulated the 
authentication scheme’s performance at 50 service providers. Note that we fix the number of log 
ins in this test at 8. The reason is that based on the previous two tests, 8 log ins appeared to have 
the least effect on both communication and computation. Figure 8.6 demonstrates the overhead 
in this setting. Similarly, Figure 8.7 shows the computation overhead with the different number 
of service providers. 
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Figure ‎8-6 Communication Overhead with Variable Number of Service Providers 
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Figure ‎8-7 Computation Overhead with Variable Number of SPs 
The main reason why this occurred is that each service provider is expected to compute 
the same number of hashes during the run of the authentication scheme. In other words, the work 
load is distributed equally among the service providers involved. In real life scenarios, this would 
be different, as the client might not use the services equally. 
8.4.5 Optimal Token Chain Length in HACH  
Although the computation and communication overheads seemed to be influenced by the 
increasing number of log ins and service providers, the length of K, which is the one-way hash 
chain length, appeared to have an unpredictable influence on the computation overhead at the 
SP’s sides. More precisely, neither did the length of this chain yield a linearly increasing 
computation, nor did it lead to a decreasing effect. For that reason, we developed an analytical 
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model in which we derived an approximate optimal length of K by computing the cost of the 
HACH scheme at the SP. 
In order to find this value, we had to account for the computations involved in the 
initialization and update of the Seed in an active Client/SP session. This cost is measured by 
adding the cost of the initial Seed generation, the hash operations to authenticate the traffic and 
the Seed updating once this chain is exhausted. While this cost is highly dependent on the 
number of transactions between the SP and C, which we gave a value of N in our notation Table 
8.1, the Seed generation and update, which are done using an SSL based connection for which 
we used I in Table 8.1. Whereas N depends on users’ behavior and differs from one application 
to another and, therefore, cannot be determined, we investigated the available literature to find an 
approximate cost of the SSL. The authors of [96] indicate that SSL is typically achieved through 
the SSL handshake protocol that usually involves three essential phases: 1) parameter 
negotiation, 2) mutual authentication and 4) secret key exchange. With this in mind, they 
measured the performance overload of SSL and found that approximately 80% of time is spent in 
SSL handshake and encryption/ decryption. Moreover, the authors of [97] analyzed SSL 
processing and found that about 70% of the total processing time of an HTTPS is spent in SSL 
processing. While computation cost of SSL is largely influenced by computing resources, an 
approximation can be made based on these statistics. In [97], they calculated the execution cost 
of the AES for key sizes of 128 and 256 and found them to be 562 and 747 cycles, respectively. 
For our derivation of the optimal chain length, we use both of these numbers for the different key 
sizes. Here is how we obtain the optimal length of K:  
𝐶𝑂 = (
𝐾×(𝐾+1)
2
+ 𝐼) ×
𝑁
𝐾
        ( ‎8.1) 
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  𝐶𝑂 =
𝑁𝐾+𝑁
2
+
𝐼𝑁
𝐾
         ( ‎8.2) 
We Differentiate the above formula with respect to K and equate to 0.   
𝜕𝐶𝑂
𝜕𝐾
=
𝑁
2
−
𝐼𝑁
𝐾2
          ( ‎8.3 ) 
𝑁
2
−
𝐼𝑁
𝐾2
= 0          ( ‎8.4 ) 
𝐾2 = 2𝐼          ( ‎8.5 ) 
𝐾 = √2𝐼          ( ‎8.6 ) 
We use this equation to plot the optimal value of K for 1500 transactions. Figure 8.8 
demonstrates that the optimal value of k if an SSL key of either size 128 or 256 bits obtained by 
simulation. These are around 33 and 38 respectively. This means that the Seed needs to be 
updated approximately every 33, 38 transactions to achieve optimal performance depending on 
the AES key size used in the SSL connection.  
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Figure ‎8-8 Optimal Chain Length for Different AES Key Sizes  
8.5 Tree-based Authentication for Toll/Traffic Management Systems 
After introducing our SSO authentication scheme, we devote this section of the chapter 
for an equally important context that requires rigorous authentication, namely, the context of 
Toll/Traffic management systems. We propose the utilization of a modified Merkle hash tree 
structure for better handling of RFID authentication in this particular context.  
Existing RFID schemes targeting traffic management contexts are mainly conceptual and 
prototypical. Little attention has been given to the important issue of authentication. With the 
rapid migration to cloud-based technology, there is a pressing urgency for addressing 
authentication in toll/ traffic RFID solutions. We introduce a toll/ traffic RFID authentication 
scheme which benefits from the well-known Merkle hash trees. The main benefit of MHTs is its 
scalability compared to traditional schemes. In order to increase scalability, we propose a scheme 
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that significantly lowers the computation complexity of the traditional MHTs. In our proposed 
scheme, we achieve practical performance and improve traditional MHTs by a simple division 
mechanism. Initial evaluation results demonstrate these benefits and show promising direction 
for further research. 
8.6 Problem Statement  
A traditional RFID system is composed of three main components: RFID tags, RFID 
readers and a back-end server. The RFID readers, which are usually able to read multiple tags 
simultaneously, send encrypted radio signals interrogating RFID tags. The RFID tags in turn 
respond with their identification information along with the data relative to the application in 
which they are applied. For a road management RFID scheme, the main goal is to achieve 
Automatic Vehicle Identification (AVI).  According to [98], AVI permits fully automatic and 
unique identification of vehicles at specific interrogation points and offers potential benefits in 
many fields such as fleet control, revenue collection, traffic operations, transportation planning, 
and safety and law enforcement. While primitive AVI techniques were based on technologies 
such as microwave and other dated technologies, more reliance on modern technologies such as 
RFID has become more common in recent systems.  
Conventionally, RFID readers send, via radio signals, interrogative commands to RFID 
tags, which in turn respond with the interrogated information. Before this process of data 
transmission is incepted, an authentication process verifying the identity of the reader and the 
authenticity of the tags is conducted. During this process, both entities perform the security 
parameters set forth by the protocols deployed in the system. The reader first sends a nonce 
message to activate the RFID tags. The tags verify the identity of the readers by checking the 
readers’ stored information. If verified, the tags respond with an encrypted message which 
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contains its identification information so that the reader verifies their authenticity. If this 
verification process is successful, the reader responds with more information containing queries 
about the data to be gathered.  
Most authentication solutions addressing this scenario fall into two major categories: 
server-based solutions and server-less solutions. The authors of [99] point out that most RFID 
authentication schemes available in the literature (e.g. [69], [75]) are either backend-server-based 
or server-less (e.g. [100] and [101]). On the one hand, schemes utilizing backend servers entail 
communication between the RFID readers and the backend server to carry out the operation of 
the schemes. Essentially, readers transmit data which they gather from RFID tags to the backend 
servers which in turn verify the authenticity of the readers and tags according to their databases. 
This constant transmission of data back and forth with the backend server necessities the 
existence of communication channels between the readers and the backend servers throughout 
the connection, presenting an authentication problem. Essentially, authentication in these 
schemes typically targets the channels between the readers and the RFID tags.  
The other category of RFID schemes is the server-less based solutions. Server-less RFID 
architectures are designed so that readers identify tags offline. While this alleviates the need for 
connecting to external resources via wireless connections, the readers are required to have an AL 
(Access List) downloaded from a CA (Certification Agency). Such solutions typically suffer 
from low scalability due to the limited capacities of the reader. In addition, they are known for 
their low privacy preservation due to the potential of readers to be tampered with either 
physically or via hacking.  
Evolving trends in RFID solutions involve migration to cloud-based environments to 
further enhance their abilities, adding new challenging dimensions to the already complicated 
 150 
authentication mechanisms. Neither server-based RFID schemes nor server-less schemes 
authentication cover the full spectrum of authentication requirements for a cloud-based RFID 
system. Therefore, our proposed authentication scheme tailored for cloud-based RFID with the 
traffic/road toll context as a basis of our scheme utilizes a Merkle hash tree to achieve 
authentication. 
8.7 The Proposed RFID Authentication Scheme  
Assuming there are several proposed schemes to address authentication between the 
readers and tags in conventional RFID schemes, the proposed scheme will be more focused on 
authenticating the communication between the RFID reader and the cloud server in the traffic 
and toll management/payment context.  
Figure 8.9 is a high level depiction of the proposed scheme to solve the authentication 
problem between the RFID readers and the cloud server utilizing Merkle hash trees (MHT). The 
basic idea of the MHT scheme is that each node in the tree is a hash function derived by the 
computation of its children.  Two pieces of information are important in the MHT scheme, 
namely the root node and the authentication path information (API). When the reader reads a tag, 
it will submit the tag’s data along with the API. To ensure the authenticity of the node sending 
the data, the API is used to calculate the root node, and if the calculated root node matches the 
stored root node, the authenticity of the data source is verified.  By doing this we can ensure 
authentication from the reader’s direction. To ensure the data stored in the cloud is confidential, 
the data to be sent to the cloud is going to be encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) for instance. Thus, T1 would be the Tag ID and the encrypted data.  
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Figure ‎8-9 Cloud-based RFID tree system 
In order to avoid the exponential growth of MHT’s if the number of the tags increases, 
we can set an upper bound on the tree size, thereby reducing computational overhead.  
Depending on the number of tags, we will have multiple trees each with a unique ID. Each 
reading of the tags will be accompanied by the corresponding tree ID. For example, if we have a 
tree with 16 leaf nodes and we need to authenticate a piece of data sent from the reader to the 
server with API, we only need 4 hash operations to calculate the root node to see if it matches the 
stored one. By doing so, not only do we aim to lower the computation overhead incurred by the 
reading and authentication of tags, but we should be able to decrease the size of authentication 
tree making the search less expensive to perform by the reader. If a reader performs a search 
within a tree of size 16 as opposed to a tree of size N, where N is the total number of tags in the 
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database, the search complexity is lowered tremendously. This is especially beneficial in the 
context of traffic management and toll payment systems, where the readers typically have one 
chance of reading the RFID tags (i.e. when the vehicle passes through the toll gate at high 
speeds).  
8.8 Protocol Components and performance 
Commonly, RFID schemes are composed of three main components: 1) RFID tags, 2) 
RFID readers and 3) a back-end server, in case it is server-based. Our proposed scheme shares 
these components but instead of a back-end server owned by the company or a third party known 
to the respective service provider, we use the cloud as a back-end server. In this case, we aim to 
secure the communication not only on the readers and RFID tags side but also on the direction 
between the readers and the cloud. For that reason, the communication between the readers and 
the cloud  is secured by the utilizing the AES protocol which is known for its security and 
robustness against different types of attacks. We chose AES despite its relatively high cost due to 
its strength and to the fact that the reader and the cloud can afford its high computation since 
both are well equipped with storage and powerful resources. In the RFID tags direction, 
however, and since they typically are much less powerful, as they are usually not capable of 
performing highly complex algorithms such as AES, we use a Merkle hash tree as depicted in 
Figure 8.2 (for more information about how authentication is achieved using a Merkle hash tree, 
please refer to section 8.3.2).  
Given the nature of the toll/ traffic management scenario described in the introduction of 
this problem statement section, which necessitates RFID readers to identify tags on the go at 
vehicles’ highway speeds, searching the whole tree to identify a certain RFID tag upon the 
passage of a vehicle in the readers’ range can be cumbersome. As such, an MHT like this does 
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not provide scalability. That is because when the tree grows to accommodate more RFID tags, 
the readers’ ability to search the tree to find the appropriate tag becomes difficult, thereby 
increasing the potential of denial of service attacks. Our proposed scheme addresses this issue by 
splitting the authentication tree into multiple smaller trees, each with its unique tree ID and its 
own set of RFID tags.   
8.9 Performance Evaluation  
In order to show the benefit of the proposed scheme, we show comparisons between the 
performance of one large MHT as opposed to multiple smaller MHTs. Let us first demonstrate 
how we calculate the cost of a single MHT in the following:  
Number of RFID tags( Leaf nodes)= N = 2
i 
Number of hash operations to authenticate one RFID tag = i-1 
Number of hash operations to authenticate all RFID tags with one MHT= N*(i-1) 
This formula is used to determine the cost of authentication in one tree. Note that we use 
the number of hash operation in a session as an indicator of the cost. Therefore, our main goal is 
to reduce this cost as much as possible. The computation cost of multiple hash trees is 
determined according to the following formula:  
Using multiple hash trees(MMHT) with a maximum size of k leaf nodes: 
Number of MHT=M =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝐷 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑠(𝑁)
𝑘
 
Number of RFID tags (Leaf nodes) in one MHT= k = 2
j
 
Number of hash operations to authenticate one RFID tag= j-1 
Number of hash operations to authenticate all RFID tags in MMHT= M*k*(j-1) 
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Before presenting the comparison results, let us look at how the branching factor 
influnces the performance of the protocol. Figures 8.12 and 8.13 below demonstrate how the size 
of the tree impacts the number of hash operations when the numer of RFID tags in the system is 
60,000. If we set the tree size at 32, we will end up having 1800 MHTs with in which 240,000 
hash operations are required. Conversely, increasing the MHT size increases the number of hash 
operations slightly, with a much reduced number trees. For an MHT of 128 nodes, we will have 
469 trees with a hash cost of 360,000. With an MHT of 64 nodes, we have 938 trees with a hash 
cost of 300,000.  
 
Figure ‎8-10 Impact of number of nodes on MHTs 
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Figure ‎8-11 Impact of the tree size on hash count 
    Based on these results, we opted for the MHT size that yields the lowest number of 
hash operations (i.e. 32) to compare the performance of the proposed protocol with traditional 
MHT based solutions. In figures 8.14 and 8.15, we show the comparison results. The results 
below are the comparison of performance of one MHT versus multiple MHTs with 32 leaf node. 
The performance comparison assumes the whole dataset is to be authenticated. To authenticate a 
single tag, we will need only 4 hash operations as Figure 8.15 demonstrates. 
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Figure ‎8-12 Performance comparison between a single MHT and multiple MHTs 
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Figure ‎8-13 Average hash count comparison with different network size 
As the comparison results demonstrate in figure 8.14, the divided MHT and the single 
MHT achieve similar performances when the number of tags in the network is small (i.e. 10,000 
RFID tags in the experiment). Earlier this chapter, we have shown that toll/traffic management 
systems typically have a large number of vehicles and that networks constantly grow in size 
which means that the RFID tags to be authenticated is much higher. The results indicate that our 
proposed scheme achieves much lower computation as the number of tags increases when 
compared to traditional MHT based solutions. 
8.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a keyless authentication scheme designed to suit multi-
server authentication environments where single-sign on is adopted. Most previous schemes 
available in the literature suffer from the lack of bi-directional authentication channels between 
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service providers and clients. In addition, the fact that authentication can occur utilizing multiple 
SSL connection requires the authentication keys used to remain constant resulting in the lack of 
recentness of the keys.  
The scheme presented in this paper addresses these issues by proposing the utilization of 
hash calendars and hash trees to derive authentication keys that can be bi-directionally verified 
and constantly changing to insure recentness. The proposed scheme was exposed to extensive 
experiments to measure communication, computation overheads and the total number of hash 
operations required to carry out the scheme. We also developed an analytical model to derive the 
optimal configuration of the one-way hash chain used for authentication between the client and 
service providers.  
Also in this chapter, we explored the possibility and benefit of utilizing the Merkle hash 
tree construction to develop an RFID based solution for authenticating RFID tags in toll/traffic 
management environment. Due to the high cost associated with MHTs especially with large 
networks of RFID tags such as the case of toll/traffic management systems, traditional MHTs do 
not provide scalability. Therefore, we have proposed dividing the MHT into multiple trees to 
better handle environments like toll/traffic systems where ID identification is needed on the go at 
highway speeds. We have shown through comparison that the proposed RFID scheme 
outperforms the traditional MHT based protocols. The improvement in performance is much 
more significant as the number of RFID tags in the network increases. In our future work, we 
will focus on determining the ideal size of the tree and the optimal branching factor.  
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 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK   CHAPTER 9:
The research in this dissertation has thus far shed some light on seven schemes that have 
been proposed to address the problem authentication in a variety of environments. In particular, 
we proposed five schemes to solve the computational overhead associated with one-way hash 
chain constructions when used to protect session cookies in HTTP connections as well as 
broadcast and user authentication in wireless sensor networks. In addition, it has introduced a 
novel solution to tackle the drawback of the uni-directional authentication channel and lack of 
key recentness in multi-server environments that utilize single sign-on mechanisms by 
employing a combination of a hash calendar, Merkle hash trees and one-way hash chains. 
Finally, an authentication scheme tailored for the context of toll/traffic management RFID 
systems was introduced.  
Session cookies are one of the widely used mechanisms to keep browser state between 
the client and the server. They are, therefore, commonly used to substitute users’ identity in 
Internet sessions as a cheaper alternative to the wide utilization of the secure HTTPS protocol or 
SSL/TSL based mechanisms which tend to be expensive and incur additional costs that service 
providers prefer to spare for other expenses. One of the major drawbacks of such practice is the 
fact that session cookies are stored and communicated in plaintext, thereby exposing critical 
private information about the user and about the services being used during that session. One 
common threat resulting from this practice is the hijacking of session cookies and other 
identifiers that belong to the user.  
Much of the research addressing the issue of session hijacking is very much preliminary 
and up to this point the majority of session cookies are communicated in the air without proper 
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protection. A major recent security breach has resulted in exposing of critical financial and 
banking information of more than 40 million customers who have shopped at Target Stores in 
the United States during the months of November and December of 2013 [102].  Although it is 
early to determine whether this breach can be attributed to hijacking session cookies or not, the 
author of [102] suspects the incident took place because of debit personal identification numbers 
interception process that targeted the giant Target retailer stores. In a different incident, the 
author of [103] talks about an attacker who claims he was able to steal session cookies pertaining 
to Yahoo accounts and selling them to the public, and offers his services to hijack more accounts 
by launching cross-site scripting attacks (XSS). These attacks according to [103] let attackers 
steal cookies from Yahoo! Webmail users.  
With attacks as easy as interception of cookies and consequences as severe as exposing 
an excess of 40 million customers’ financial information, addressing issues of Internet, and 
especially session cookies security, is an ever growing necessity. A new direction of research in 
[10] suggested devising Lamport’s one-time passwords  [38] as a means with which cookies can 
be made secure. We described in the previous chapters that this promising solution offers a great 
potential and help avoid a lot of security threats seen in today’s Internet. It is well known that the 
computational overhead resulting from the need to calculate the hash values of the one-way hash 
chain in the first transaction can be high and unmanageable by devices with modest memory and 
energy capabilities, and sometimes undesired by even the highly capable devices simply because 
we do not want to add burdens on our computers. Having this in mind, we designed five novel 
schemes that will aid in lowering this computational overhead while at the same time benefiting 
from the excellent security features of one-way hash functions. We have demonstrated with 
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extensive experiments that our solutions achieved better performance that the straightforwardly 
configured hash chains. 
Another equally important issue that this dissertation has addressed is the context of 
multi-server environments where single-sign on mechanisms provide convenience for customers 
and cost effectiveness for providers at the potential cost of breached security. Scholars have 
pointed out that due to flaws encountered in the logic of common SSO solutions such as XAML 
2.0 and OpenID, attackers can possibly launch attacks such as impersonation and cross-scripting 
targeting weaknesses that result from the unidirectional nature of the authentication channel 
between clients and service providers and the lack of guarantees of recent keys. With these 
weaknesses in mind, we have developed a keyless signature scheme that achieves authentication 
channel bi-directionality between the client and the service provider and a recent authentication 
key by periodically updating authentication credentials.  
The last proposed scheme targets the context of toll/traffic management systems that 
utilize RFID tags. An authentication scheme employing a modified Merkle hash tree is suggested 
to address authentication of RFID tags in this contexts. The Merkle hash tree modification 
proposed is aims to achieve scalability and computational economy while not sacrificing strong 
authentication.  
9.1 Future Work 
The work in this dissertation can be extended and improved in a variety of ways. For 
example, in the context of the sparse caching solution proposed to avoid session hijacking 
attacks, a possible extension can be made by measuring real network traffic and finding accurate 
statistics about the number of transactions a typical user session is. This can be achieved by 
looking at more specific contexts such as medical settings where physicians and nurses typically 
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have a relatively tangible behavior. Another possibility to extend our work in this scheme is 
investigate the cost of session re-initialization as it is important to measure such construct to 
validate the result obtained.  
While our solutions have been targeting cookies in HTTP connections, a possible 
extension of the works reported in this dissertation is to compare their performance with the 
utilization of SSL based connections throughout user session. However, in order to do that, it is 
imperative to implement and evaluate the proposed schemes in real networks before moving to 
the next step of comparing their potential benefits relative to SSL based channels. 
As far as the SSO authentication scheme, our future work includes comparing the results 
obtained in our simulation with other schemes available in the literature. This will require 
analyzing and interpreting current SSO authentication schemes and comparing them with the 
proposed keyless signature scheme.  
Finally, the work in the tree-based toll/traffic RFID management system can be extended 
by analyzing behavior in RFID networks and ultimately finding the appropriate setup of the 
Merkle hash tree suitable for this environment. This will result in a more scalable scheme; one 
that is attractive for developers in this arena.  
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